The Royals have fielded a lot of pretty miserable teams over the past decade. But one thing that probably shouldn't be said, is that they've been cheapskates. No, they haven't fielded huge payrolls, but compared to teams like the Marlins, Pirates, Rays, and Padres, the Royals have at least shown some willingness to spend money.
Now, following the trade of Zack Greinke and Yuniesky Betancourt, which rid the team of about 17.5m in salary from their projected 2011 payroll, the Royals find themselves at just around 42m dollars in projected payroll. That mark, should it hold, would be the lowest opening day payroll for the Royals since 2005, and would be just the second time since 2002 that they had such a miniscule payroll.
Given that the Royals have opened the past two seasons with payrolls of over 70m, it would seem that they probably have at least a little money to spend. Now, I'm not suggesting that the Royals are candidates to make a big splash or anything, but thy certainly have some payroll to utilize in shoring up their bullpen or rotation. Both of which are frighteningly thin. That said, the team has a multitude of talented youngsters in it's system, and any signings should be shorter (1-2 years) in length to allow for those young players to come up when they're ready.
If we assume that the Royals now have another 15-20m to work with - which would bring them into the 55-60m range - then perhaps making a run at a bounce back player (Brandon Webb?) could work. It could give fans a reason to come to the ballpark and it'd provide Webb with a nice rebound opportunity. Certainly Webb is a long shot, he's going to get solid offers from a couple contenders, this much we know. But with so much payroll in hand, and the deal being for just one or two years, the Royals can afford to overpay a bit.
Another other option of course, would be to reinvest that money elsewhere - like the international market and perhaps make a couple big signings out of the Caribbean? Maybe you draft some tough-sign candidates in the draft and make aggressive offers to try and lure them away from college ball. This draft class is supposed t be one of the deeper ones in the past few years after all.
Either way, the Royals should have some money to work with. It'll be interesting to see how they decide to utilize it.
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Royals Payroll Estimate #2
This estimate reflects only players who are currently under team control for the 2011 season. It does not include any speculation on players who will be signed via free agency or those who will be acquired via trade. This list will change as the off season progress, and players are acquired, or lost.
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Updates*
- Non-Tendered Josh Fields
- Signed Melky Cabrera for 1y/1.5m
- Signed Jeff Francouer for 1y/2.5m
- Traded Zach Greinke and Yuniesky Betancourt for Alcides Escobar, Lorenzo Cain, Jeremy Jeffress, and Jake Odorizzi.
C) Jason Kendall - 3.75m
1B) Billy Butler - 2.0m*
2B) Mike Aviles - 450k
3B)
SS) Alcides Escobar - 450k
LF) Alex Gordon - 2.0m*
CF) Lorenzo Cain - 450k
RF) Jeff Francouer - 2.5m
DH) Kila Ka'aihue - 450k
BN) Brayan Pena - 750k*
BN) Joaquin Arias - 450k
BN) Mitch Maier - 450k
BN) Melky Cabrera - 1.25m
SP) Gil Meche - 12.0m
SP) Luke Hochevar - 2.5m*
SP) Kyle Davies - 2.5m*
SP) Vin Mazzaro - 450k
SP)
RP)
RP) Blake Wood - 450k
RP) Dusty Hughes - 450k
RP) Sean O'Sullivan - 450k
RP) Kevin Pucetas - 450k
RP) Robinson Tejada - 1.5m*
RP) Joakim Soria - 4.0m
MiLB Costs:
- Noel Agruelles 1.38m
- Aaron Crow: 1.0m
Total: 42.08m
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Updates*
- Non-Tendered Josh Fields
- Signed Melky Cabrera for 1y/1.5m
- Signed Jeff Francouer for 1y/2.5m
- Traded Zach Greinke and Yuniesky Betancourt for Alcides Escobar, Lorenzo Cain, Jeremy Jeffress, and Jake Odorizzi.
C) Jason Kendall - 3.75m
1B) Billy Butler - 2.0m*
2B) Mike Aviles - 450k
3B)
SS) Alcides Escobar - 450k
LF) Alex Gordon - 2.0m*
CF) Lorenzo Cain - 450k
RF) Jeff Francouer - 2.5m
DH) Kila Ka'aihue - 450k
BN) Brayan Pena - 750k*
BN) Joaquin Arias - 450k
BN) Mitch Maier - 450k
BN) Melky Cabrera - 1.25m
SP) Gil Meche - 12.0m
SP) Luke Hochevar - 2.5m*
SP) Kyle Davies - 2.5m*
SP) Vin Mazzaro - 450k
SP)
RP)
RP) Blake Wood - 450k
RP) Dusty Hughes - 450k
RP) Sean O'Sullivan - 450k
RP) Kevin Pucetas - 450k
RP) Robinson Tejada - 1.5m*
RP) Joakim Soria - 4.0m
MiLB Costs:
- Noel Agruelles 1.38m
- Aaron Crow: 1.0m
Total: 42.08m
The Greinke Trade
Brewers Get:
Zack Greinke (5.2 WAR)
Yuniesky Betancourt (0.6 WAR)
Royals Get:
Lorenzo Cain (1.5 WAR)
Alcides Escobar (0.6 WAR)
Jeremy Jeffress (0.1 WAR)
Jake Odorizzi (A-)
Much more after the break.
Zack Greinke (5.2 WAR)
Yuniesky Betancourt (0.6 WAR)
Royals Get:
Lorenzo Cain (1.5 WAR)
Alcides Escobar (0.6 WAR)
Jeremy Jeffress (0.1 WAR)
Jake Odorizzi (A-)
Much more after the break.
Monday, December 20, 2010
Jake Peavy is Looking Good?
At this point of the year it's really nothing more than speculation and as such, should be taken with a ten pound bag of salt, but it's certainly not a BAD thing that White Sox pitching coach Don Cooper is saying,
Of course, the one thing you wont hear White Sox personnel say is that regardless of when Peavy makes it back, it's no sure thing that he'll be able to contribute at the level he did during his Padre days. Injuries unfortunately have been decidedly unkind to Peavy the past few years and as we saw last year, it took Peavy some time to regain his form after a terrible start to the season.
It's possible that the team could look to sign someone else to fill in for Peavy if they would prefer to have Sale open the season - Freddy Garcia is an oft mentioned candidate - but given the teams financial situation that would seem to be a difficult task to accomplish.
"I really didn't think he would be right there. I thought it would be slower, but he hopped right into it and has a chance to be ready."That of course, is in regard to Sox ace Jake Peavy's rehab from a torn lat muscle. I'm not an injury expect by any means (nor have I ever played one on TV) but obviously an early return from Peavy would be in the White Sox best interests. The team is long on talent in the rotation, but frighteningly thin in terms of depth, with Chris Sale expected to open the season in the rotation in Peavy's absence.
Of course, the one thing you wont hear White Sox personnel say is that regardless of when Peavy makes it back, it's no sure thing that he'll be able to contribute at the level he did during his Padre days. Injuries unfortunately have been decidedly unkind to Peavy the past few years and as we saw last year, it took Peavy some time to regain his form after a terrible start to the season.
It's possible that the team could look to sign someone else to fill in for Peavy if they would prefer to have Sale open the season - Freddy Garcia is an oft mentioned candidate - but given the teams financial situation that would seem to be a difficult task to accomplish.
White Sox Payroll Estimate #3
This estimate reflects only players who are currently under team control for the 2011 season. It does not include any speculation on players who will be signed via free agency or those who will be acquired via trade. This list will change as the off season progress, and players are acquired, or lost.
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed 1B/LF/DH Adam Dunn for 4y/56m: 12m (2011) / 14m (2012) / 15m (2013 and 2014)
- Signed Catcher A.J. Pierzynski for 2y/8m: 2m (2011) / 6m (2012)
- Signed First Baseman Paul Konerko for 3y/37.5m: 12m (2011 and 2012) / 13.5m (2013)
- Traded relief pitcher Scott Linebrink to Braves: 1y/5.5m (Sox sent 3m to cover part of Linebrink's salary)
- Non-tendered closer Bobby Jenks
- Signed Relief Pitcher Jesse Crain for 3y/13m: 4.0m (2011) / 4.5m (2012 and 2013)
C) A.J. Pierzynski - 2.0m
1B) Paul Konerko - 12.0m
2B) Gordon Beckham - 450k
3B) Brent Morel - 450k
SS) Alexi Ramirez - 2.75m
LF) Juan Pierre - 5.0m (8.5m less 3.5m paid by Dodgers)
CF) Alex Rios - 12.5m
RF) Carlos Quentin - 5.0m*
DH) Adam Dunn - 12.0m
BN) Dayan Viciedo - 2.25m
BN) Omar Vizquel - 1.75m
BN) Mark Teahan - 4.75m*
BN) Ramon Castro - 1.2m
SP) Jake Peavy- 16.0m
SP) John Danks - 5.5m*
SP) Gavin Floyd - 5.0m
SP) Mark Buehrle - 14.0m
SP) Edwin Jackson - 8.75m
RP)
RP)
RP) Tony Pena - 1.5m*
RP) Sergio Santos - 450k
RP) Chris Sale - 450k
RP) Jesse Crain - 4.0m
RP) Matt Thornton - 3.0m
Other:
Scott Linebrink - 3.5m
Total: 124.25m
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed 1B/LF/DH Adam Dunn for 4y/56m: 12m (2011) / 14m (2012) / 15m (2013 and 2014)
- Signed Catcher A.J. Pierzynski for 2y/8m: 2m (2011) / 6m (2012)
- Signed First Baseman Paul Konerko for 3y/37.5m: 12m (2011 and 2012) / 13.5m (2013)
- Traded relief pitcher Scott Linebrink to Braves: 1y/5.5m (Sox sent 3m to cover part of Linebrink's salary)
- Non-tendered closer Bobby Jenks
- Signed Relief Pitcher Jesse Crain for 3y/13m: 4.0m (2011) / 4.5m (2012 and 2013)
C) A.J. Pierzynski - 2.0m
1B) Paul Konerko - 12.0m
2B) Gordon Beckham - 450k
3B) Brent Morel - 450k
SS) Alexi Ramirez - 2.75m
LF) Juan Pierre - 5.0m (8.5m less 3.5m paid by Dodgers)
CF) Alex Rios - 12.5m
RF) Carlos Quentin - 5.0m*
DH) Adam Dunn - 12.0m
BN) Dayan Viciedo - 2.25m
BN) Omar Vizquel - 1.75m
BN) Mark Teahan - 4.75m*
BN) Ramon Castro - 1.2m
SP) Jake Peavy- 16.0m
SP) John Danks - 5.5m*
SP) Gavin Floyd - 5.0m
SP) Mark Buehrle - 14.0m
SP) Edwin Jackson - 8.75m
RP)
RP)
RP) Tony Pena - 1.5m*
RP) Sergio Santos - 450k
RP) Chris Sale - 450k
RP) Jesse Crain - 4.0m
RP) Matt Thornton - 3.0m
Other:
Scott Linebrink - 3.5m
Total: 124.25m
The Kansas City Braves
I've been made aware that there has been "Bigger News" out of Kansas City recently than the signings of Melky Cabrera and Jeff Francouer, and I will certainly expound on that subject soon. But with Alex Gordon likely to spend his first full season in the outfield in 2010, and long-time outfield David DeJesus having been traded away, the Royals were in need of some help in the outfield.
They could've done better. Or maybe I should say, they couldn't have done much worse. It's moves like these by General Manager Dayton Moore that I just don't get.
It's not that the price tags of either Francouer (2.5m) or Cabrera (1.25m with another 250k in incentives) are exorbitant - it's that the signings are essentially pointless. Neither Cabrera, who was worth a stunningly bad -1.2 WAR (which is astonishingly hard to pull off) nor Francouer, who was worth 0.7 WAR are going to add anything of value to the Royals. Francouer hasn't posted an OPS over .740 since 2007, and Cabrera has a career OPS of just .707 and was in the .670 range last year.
Why, pray tell, would a team that will be entering it's 20th or so straight rebuilding year waste two roster spots on that pair? Is there something that Cabrera is going to give you in center that Mitch Maier or Jarrod Dyson wont?
Is there something that Jeff Francouer is going to do for a franchise that Andrew Jones couldn't do? Word is he wants a full-time job, and heavens knows he isn't going to get one with a playoff caliber squad. He still looks like he has at least a little something to give.
I understand that the outfield situation for the Royals was a bit more unsettled prior to the "Bigger News" of this week, but still, these signings made little sense. It just seems such a needless waste of 3.75m perfectly good dollars.
That might not seem like much to most, but properly invested, that money could've been used to bring in a player who at least had a chance, with a good year, of qualifying as a Type-B free agent and potentially helping the Royals in 2011, and more importantly, providing the franchise with another valuable draft pick.
Given a chance to do something useful, it's disappointing to see Moore make moves with essentially zero chance of helping the Royals either now or in the future.
They could've done better. Or maybe I should say, they couldn't have done much worse. It's moves like these by General Manager Dayton Moore that I just don't get.
It's not that the price tags of either Francouer (2.5m) or Cabrera (1.25m with another 250k in incentives) are exorbitant - it's that the signings are essentially pointless. Neither Cabrera, who was worth a stunningly bad -1.2 WAR (which is astonishingly hard to pull off) nor Francouer, who was worth 0.7 WAR are going to add anything of value to the Royals. Francouer hasn't posted an OPS over .740 since 2007, and Cabrera has a career OPS of just .707 and was in the .670 range last year.
Why, pray tell, would a team that will be entering it's 20th or so straight rebuilding year waste two roster spots on that pair? Is there something that Cabrera is going to give you in center that Mitch Maier or Jarrod Dyson wont?
Is there something that Jeff Francouer is going to do for a franchise that Andrew Jones couldn't do? Word is he wants a full-time job, and heavens knows he isn't going to get one with a playoff caliber squad. He still looks like he has at least a little something to give.
I understand that the outfield situation for the Royals was a bit more unsettled prior to the "Bigger News" of this week, but still, these signings made little sense. It just seems such a needless waste of 3.75m perfectly good dollars.
That might not seem like much to most, but properly invested, that money could've been used to bring in a player who at least had a chance, with a good year, of qualifying as a Type-B free agent and potentially helping the Royals in 2011, and more importantly, providing the franchise with another valuable draft pick.
Given a chance to do something useful, it's disappointing to see Moore make moves with essentially zero chance of helping the Royals either now or in the future.
Twins Payroll Estimate #2
This estimate reflects only players who are currently under team control for the 2011 season. It does not include any speculation on players who will be signed via free agency or those who will be acquired via trade. This list will change as the off season progress, and players are acquired, or lost.
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Traded Shortstop J.J. Hardy and utility man Brendan Harris (+500K) for Relief Pitcher Jim Hoey and MiLB Pitcher Paul Bargas.
- Drafted Scott Diamond in Rule V Draft.
C: Mauer - 23.0m
1B: Morneau - 14.0m
2B: Nishioka - 3.0m
3B: Valencia - 450k
SS: Casilla - 800k*
LF: Young - 5.5m*
CF: Span - 1.0m
RF: Cuddyer - 10.5m
DH: Kubel - 5.25m
BN: Butera - 450k
BN: Tolbert - 450k
BN: Plouffe - 450k
BN:
SP: Liriano - 4.5m*
SP: Baker - 5.0m
SP: Blackburn - 3.0m
SP: Slowey - 2.5m*
SP: Duensing - 450k
RP:
RP: Diamond - 450k
RP: Hoey - 450k
RP: Perkins - 750k*
RP: Mijares - 450k
RP: Capps - 7.5m*
RP: Nathan - 11.25m
Buyout: Punto - 500k
Orioles: 2.0m in Hardy/Harris trade.
Total: 103.65m
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Traded Shortstop J.J. Hardy and utility man Brendan Harris (+500K) for Relief Pitcher Jim Hoey and MiLB Pitcher Paul Bargas.
- Drafted Scott Diamond in Rule V Draft.
C: Mauer - 23.0m
1B: Morneau - 14.0m
2B: Nishioka - 3.0m
3B: Valencia - 450k
SS: Casilla - 800k*
LF: Young - 5.5m*
CF: Span - 1.0m
RF: Cuddyer - 10.5m
DH: Kubel - 5.25m
BN: Butera - 450k
BN: Tolbert - 450k
BN: Plouffe - 450k
BN:
SP: Liriano - 4.5m*
SP: Baker - 5.0m
SP: Blackburn - 3.0m
SP: Slowey - 2.5m*
SP: Duensing - 450k
RP:
RP: Diamond - 450k
RP: Hoey - 450k
RP: Perkins - 750k*
RP: Mijares - 450k
RP: Capps - 7.5m*
RP: Nathan - 11.25m
Buyout: Punto - 500k
Orioles: 2.0m in Hardy/Harris trade.
Total: 103.65m
Tigers Payroll Estimate #3
This estimate reflects only players who are currently under team control for the 2011 season. It does not include any speculation on players who will be signed via free agency or those who will be acquired via trade. This list will change as the off season progress, and players are acquired, or lost.
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed Catcher Victor Martinez for 4y/50m: 12.0m (2011) / 13.0m (2012+2013) / 12.0m (2014)
- Signed Reliever Joaquin Benoit for 3y/16.5m: 5.5m per year.
- Signed Outfielder Magglio Ordonez for 1y/10.0m
C) Victor Martinez - 12.0m
1B) Miguel Cabrera - 20.0m
2B) Scott Sizemore - 450k
3B) Brandon Inge - 5.5m
SS) Johnny Peralta - 5.25m
LF) Ryan Raburn - 1.5m*
CF) Austin Jackson - 450k
RF) Magglio Ordonez - 10.0m
DH) Carlos Guillen - 13.0m
BN) Ramon Santiago - 1.25m
BN) Don Kelly - 450k
BN) Casper Wells - 450k
BN) Alex Avila - 450k
SP) Justin Verlander - 12.85m
SP) Max Scherzer - 450k
SP) Rick Porcello - 1.535m
SP) Armando Gallaraga - 1.5m*
SP) Phil Coke - 450k
RP)
RP) Daniel Schlereth - 450k
RP) Fu-Te Ni - 450k
RP) Ryan Perry - 450k
RP) Joel Zumaya - 1.5m*
RP) Joaquin Beniot - 5.5m
RP) Jose Valverde - 7.0m
MiLB Costs:
Jacob Turner - 1.175m
Total: 104.06m
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed Catcher Victor Martinez for 4y/50m: 12.0m (2011) / 13.0m (2012+2013) / 12.0m (2014)
- Signed Reliever Joaquin Benoit for 3y/16.5m: 5.5m per year.
- Signed Outfielder Magglio Ordonez for 1y/10.0m
C) Victor Martinez - 12.0m
1B) Miguel Cabrera - 20.0m
2B) Scott Sizemore - 450k
3B) Brandon Inge - 5.5m
SS) Johnny Peralta - 5.25m
LF) Ryan Raburn - 1.5m*
CF) Austin Jackson - 450k
RF) Magglio Ordonez - 10.0m
DH) Carlos Guillen - 13.0m
BN) Ramon Santiago - 1.25m
BN) Don Kelly - 450k
BN) Casper Wells - 450k
BN) Alex Avila - 450k
SP) Justin Verlander - 12.85m
SP) Max Scherzer - 450k
SP) Rick Porcello - 1.535m
SP) Armando Gallaraga - 1.5m*
SP) Phil Coke - 450k
RP)
RP) Daniel Schlereth - 450k
RP) Fu-Te Ni - 450k
RP) Ryan Perry - 450k
RP) Joel Zumaya - 1.5m*
RP) Joaquin Beniot - 5.5m
RP) Jose Valverde - 7.0m
MiLB Costs:
Jacob Turner - 1.175m
Total: 104.06m
Tsuyoshi Nishioka and Birds in Flight
In completing their signing of 26 year old Japanese middle infielder Tsuyoshi Nishioka the Minnesota Twins "solved" at least half of the middle infield puzzle that was created when the team allowed second baseman Orlando Hudson to leave via free agency and traded away shortstop J.J. Hardy. And, if I were to judge the quality of a signing simply by fan reaction, this would appear to be great news.
I'm not so sure.
While Nishioka had a phenomenal 2010 campaign that saw him hit .346/.423/.482 - .905, while being named the MVP of the NPB, he had a career OPS of just .758 entering 2010 after seven professional seasons. For as troubling as it is that his 2010 campaign is such a significant outlier - it's equally unsurprising to see that it was largely the result of almost insurmountably good luck as he had a BABIP of .395 after having a career BABIP of just .322.
If we were to normalize his 2010 season by gutting those 73 extra points of BABIP, you're left with something much closer to his career OPS mark of .758. A line of .273/.350/.380 - .730. On top of that, he'll be playing in a league that has proven to be extremely harsh to every Japanese player (not named Ichiro) to make the switch. Even good players like Hideki Matsui went from being 50 home run hitters (in a 140 game season) to maxing out at 31 in the Majors. While Nishioka managed to hit 14 home runs last year, and 13 in 2009, I'm guessing that like every Japanese player who came before him, he'll lose most, if not all of that pop in the Majors.
With all the gloom and doom parsed, I should note that Nishioka does have some skills that should translate to the Majors. He's demonstrated a good eye at the plate throughout his career, and does a good job limiting the strikeouts, suggesting that he's a decent contact hitter. He's also got some speed, as he managed to steal an average of 28 bases during his six full seasons in NPB. Unfortunately, his success rate of just 72% is a tick below the point where stealing bases is actually beneficial, and moving to a league where the catchers are much better is going to limit his ability to steal bases as well.
The more I think about this, and the more I discuss it with others, the more it becomes apparent to me that it's significantly more likely that Nishioka's 2010 season was a flash in the pan. Something that, even in the significantly easier NPB, would be almost impossible for Nishioka to duplicate.
At his best, I see Nishioka as a .275/.350/.400 hitter in the Majors, and even that relatively paltry .750 OPS seems more and more unlikely as the facts of the situation continue to percolate inside my mind. It's probably more likely that he hits .260/.330/.360. Of course, given the MLB average OPS for shortstops (.690) and second basemen (.718) in 2010 - a .690 mark isn't quite as bad as it would first appear.
And lest we forget, offense isn't all that encompasses Tsuyoshi Nishioka (or any non-DH I guess...). He's also a three time winner of the NPBs version of the Gold Glove, having won the award at both second base and shortstop. If he can manage to be a plus defender in the Majors that could add significantly to his value. That's no sure thing, but it's significantly more likely that his defense transfers over than his offense.
So let us assume that Nishioka provides a .690 OPS and a +5 UZR/150. That would essentially make him a league average middle infielder - or maybe just slightly below average. Given the Twins total commitment of about 14.5m between his 9.25m in guaranteed contract and the 5.3m bid- they'll essentially be paying him like a 1.1 or 1.2 WAR player. That's something Nishioka should be perfectly capable of being, even given my predictions of a threadbare offensive game.
Now that I've provided you with eight paragraphs of predominantly negative commentary, let me also note that Nishioka will be just 26 in 2011 and that there is plenty of time left for him to improve his game and it's almost certain that his best years are ahead of him. If Nishioka can improve, say into the .750 OPS player I mentioned as his upside earlier, and instead of being a +5 UZR/150 player, were to be a +1- UZR/150 player - well, now you're talking about one of the better overall middle infielders in the game.
In that scenario, the Twins would have locked up a player who was simply capable, they'd have locked up a very good (not quite all-star) player through the prime of his career who could be worth as much as 3-4 WAR at a cut-throat rate. It's likely that Nishioka will, at the least, prove to be a competent every day player, and indeed, there is the possibility for more.
For Twins fans sake, we ought to hope that he outperforms my estimate of a .690 OPS because if not, the Twins jettisoned two players in Hardy and Hudson who were perfectly capable of producing similar or better results for a similar amount. And you know the old saying...
I'm not so sure.
While Nishioka had a phenomenal 2010 campaign that saw him hit .346/.423/.482 - .905, while being named the MVP of the NPB, he had a career OPS of just .758 entering 2010 after seven professional seasons. For as troubling as it is that his 2010 campaign is such a significant outlier - it's equally unsurprising to see that it was largely the result of almost insurmountably good luck as he had a BABIP of .395 after having a career BABIP of just .322.
If we were to normalize his 2010 season by gutting those 73 extra points of BABIP, you're left with something much closer to his career OPS mark of .758. A line of .273/.350/.380 - .730. On top of that, he'll be playing in a league that has proven to be extremely harsh to every Japanese player (not named Ichiro) to make the switch. Even good players like Hideki Matsui went from being 50 home run hitters (in a 140 game season) to maxing out at 31 in the Majors. While Nishioka managed to hit 14 home runs last year, and 13 in 2009, I'm guessing that like every Japanese player who came before him, he'll lose most, if not all of that pop in the Majors.
With all the gloom and doom parsed, I should note that Nishioka does have some skills that should translate to the Majors. He's demonstrated a good eye at the plate throughout his career, and does a good job limiting the strikeouts, suggesting that he's a decent contact hitter. He's also got some speed, as he managed to steal an average of 28 bases during his six full seasons in NPB. Unfortunately, his success rate of just 72% is a tick below the point where stealing bases is actually beneficial, and moving to a league where the catchers are much better is going to limit his ability to steal bases as well.
The more I think about this, and the more I discuss it with others, the more it becomes apparent to me that it's significantly more likely that Nishioka's 2010 season was a flash in the pan. Something that, even in the significantly easier NPB, would be almost impossible for Nishioka to duplicate.
At his best, I see Nishioka as a .275/.350/.400 hitter in the Majors, and even that relatively paltry .750 OPS seems more and more unlikely as the facts of the situation continue to percolate inside my mind. It's probably more likely that he hits .260/.330/.360. Of course, given the MLB average OPS for shortstops (.690) and second basemen (.718) in 2010 - a .690 mark isn't quite as bad as it would first appear.
And lest we forget, offense isn't all that encompasses Tsuyoshi Nishioka (or any non-DH I guess...). He's also a three time winner of the NPBs version of the Gold Glove, having won the award at both second base and shortstop. If he can manage to be a plus defender in the Majors that could add significantly to his value. That's no sure thing, but it's significantly more likely that his defense transfers over than his offense.
So let us assume that Nishioka provides a .690 OPS and a +5 UZR/150. That would essentially make him a league average middle infielder - or maybe just slightly below average. Given the Twins total commitment of about 14.5m between his 9.25m in guaranteed contract and the 5.3m bid- they'll essentially be paying him like a 1.1 or 1.2 WAR player. That's something Nishioka should be perfectly capable of being, even given my predictions of a threadbare offensive game.
Now that I've provided you with eight paragraphs of predominantly negative commentary, let me also note that Nishioka will be just 26 in 2011 and that there is plenty of time left for him to improve his game and it's almost certain that his best years are ahead of him. If Nishioka can improve, say into the .750 OPS player I mentioned as his upside earlier, and instead of being a +5 UZR/150 player, were to be a +1- UZR/150 player - well, now you're talking about one of the better overall middle infielders in the game.
In that scenario, the Twins would have locked up a player who was simply capable, they'd have locked up a very good (not quite all-star) player through the prime of his career who could be worth as much as 3-4 WAR at a cut-throat rate. It's likely that Nishioka will, at the least, prove to be a competent every day player, and indeed, there is the possibility for more.
For Twins fans sake, we ought to hope that he outperforms my estimate of a .690 OPS because if not, the Twins jettisoned two players in Hardy and Hudson who were perfectly capable of producing similar or better results for a similar amount. And you know the old saying...
The Case Against Carl Pavano
Baseball has been an interesting journey for Carl Pavano.
After a phenomenal 2004 season where he posted a 3.00 ERA for the Marlins, the Yankees signed him to one of the most maligned contracts in baseball history. A four year, forty million dollar deal (39.75m technically) that imploded in epic fashion as Pavano struggled through every legitimate injury imaginable, and others - bruised buttocks? - not so imaginable. In total, Pavano would make just 26 starts for the Yankees.
His next contract, a one year 1.5m dollar deal with incentives from the Indians would not prove to be so significant. But it was during this time that Pavano finally managed to re-establish himself as a solid starting pitching option. The Indians of course traded Pavano to the Twins after the 2009 trade deadline in a minor deal for Yohan Pino. Pavano went on to pitch brilliantly down the stretch for the Twins that year as they overcame the Tigers in an epic 163rd game. He also made two solid playoff appearances, but wasn't able to prevent the Twins from being swept out of the first round by his former team two years in a row.
Now, after throwing 221 innings while registering a 3.75 ERA, Pavano finds himself perhaps the most sought-after free agent starting pitcher with Cliff Lee off the table. He's in line for a multi-year deal worth at least 10m per season. But just how much is Pavano worth, and is he worth the risk?
To figure that out, we first need to figure out exactly what type of pitcher Carl Pavano is, and how he projects going forward. I think the simplest way of putting it would be to say he's an innings-eater. His journey through the Yankees minefield aside, Pavano has registered at least 199 innings in his four healthy seasons. He logs those innings without particularly dominant stuff: a fastball that averaged 90.1mph, slider and changeup, and a strikeout rate of just 5.72 for his career. A rate that dropped to a career low 4.76 last year.
What Pavano lacks in ability to miss bats, he helps to make up for in control. With a very good career walk rate of 2.26, his 1.51 mark in 2010 helped to offset the loss in ability to strike batters out and ensured that even with such a miniscule strikeout rate, he still managed to post a 3.16 K/BB ratio. Pavano pairs his low walk/low strikeout combination with solid ground ball rates which, like his walk rate, reached a career best mark of 51.2% in 2010.
While the metrics have changed a little bit, with both the strikeout and walk rates coming down a little from his time with the Marlins and Expos, Pavano essentially remains the same pitcher he was at the start of the decade. He came out throwing in the low 90s (90.7 his first two years), and his career 5.72K / 2.26BB / and 46% GB rates are reasonably similar to what you saw in his 2010 campaign.
The problem is that with the exception of his 2004 and 2010 seasons (coincidentally both walk years) that combination has never really produced particularly impressive results. His 2010 ERA was largely the result of a somewhat beneficial .286 BABIP and a career best 74% LOB rate (along with the career best walk and ground ball rates). Like most pitchers who pitch long enough, his career ERA (4.34) and FIP/xFIP marks (4.15/4.11) match up nicely, and both suggest that Pavano is what we thought he was. A mediocre innings eater.
He's not an ace. He's not a number two.
He's more of a #3 who can be relied on to chew up innings.
Most speculation suggests that Pavano is aiming for a three-year deal that would average something in the neighborhood of 12m per season. Similarly, there is a lot of speculation that the teams interested don't want to go beyond two years. In all likelihood, a team that showed a willingness to go to three years would claim Pavano rather quickly, and I'm guessing that's what he's holding out for.
And so we wind up back at our original question, what is Carl Pavano worth?
On a pure WAR level, his average of around 3.7 WAR during his last four healthy seasons suggests he's certainly worth the 12.0m he's seeking on a per annum basis, and his track record (Yankees saga aside) suggests he's worth that.
Of course, looking strictly at WAR levels can be deceiving. What teams really look at is replacement value - "how much better is player B compared to player A who is already on my team)".
In the Twins case, the most likely player to be replaced would be Kevin Slowey. Slowey is a capable pitcher (6.86K/1.50BB - 31.6%GB) in his own right, though he suffers from being one of the most fly-ball prone pitchers in the league. He also struggles to pitch deep into games, but still managed to log 155 innings in just 28 starts, not a terrible mark, but still almost 70 fewer innings than Pavano logged last year.
With a depleted bullpen, those extra 50-70 innings that Pavano could provide become more significant, as it essentially removes an entire reliever from the equation. In the Twins case, a reliever that's likely to trend toward replacement level.
Replacing Slowey with Pavano will, without a doubt, make the Twins better. It may also help offset some of the cost of Pavano if the Twins were to subsequently trade Slowey and the 2.5m I expect him to get in arbitration. Or perhaps the Twins could look to move Brian Duensing back to the bullpen, and bolster a group left with little beyond Joe Nathan and Matt Capps. They've got some options.
The flip side of course is that Pavano will almost certainly not be as good in 2011 as he was in 2010. His peripherals don't support such sustained success and therefor, you ultimately end up paying an extra 8-10m (the approximate difference between Slowey's 2.5m and Pavano's 10-12m) for an extra 50-70 innings of work from your rotation.
What if, instead of investing 12m into Pavano for 2010, the Twins were to instead spend 8m on a pair of free agent relievers by bringing back Jon Rauch and bringing in Arthur Rhodes? That pair would give manager Ron Gardenhire five options out of his bullpen ranging from decent (Jose Mijares) to amazing (Nathan) - and overall, provide the Twins with approximately 100 innings of work that's likely to be as good, or better, than what they'd get from Pavano.
As with any player move there are dozens of factors that need to be considered. But it's my opinion that the Twins could spend 10-12m in ways that would make more sense than making a marginal improvement at starting pitcher.
After a phenomenal 2004 season where he posted a 3.00 ERA for the Marlins, the Yankees signed him to one of the most maligned contracts in baseball history. A four year, forty million dollar deal (39.75m technically) that imploded in epic fashion as Pavano struggled through every legitimate injury imaginable, and others - bruised buttocks? - not so imaginable. In total, Pavano would make just 26 starts for the Yankees.
His next contract, a one year 1.5m dollar deal with incentives from the Indians would not prove to be so significant. But it was during this time that Pavano finally managed to re-establish himself as a solid starting pitching option. The Indians of course traded Pavano to the Twins after the 2009 trade deadline in a minor deal for Yohan Pino. Pavano went on to pitch brilliantly down the stretch for the Twins that year as they overcame the Tigers in an epic 163rd game. He also made two solid playoff appearances, but wasn't able to prevent the Twins from being swept out of the first round by his former team two years in a row.
Now, after throwing 221 innings while registering a 3.75 ERA, Pavano finds himself perhaps the most sought-after free agent starting pitcher with Cliff Lee off the table. He's in line for a multi-year deal worth at least 10m per season. But just how much is Pavano worth, and is he worth the risk?
To figure that out, we first need to figure out exactly what type of pitcher Carl Pavano is, and how he projects going forward. I think the simplest way of putting it would be to say he's an innings-eater. His journey through the Yankees minefield aside, Pavano has registered at least 199 innings in his four healthy seasons. He logs those innings without particularly dominant stuff: a fastball that averaged 90.1mph, slider and changeup, and a strikeout rate of just 5.72 for his career. A rate that dropped to a career low 4.76 last year.
What Pavano lacks in ability to miss bats, he helps to make up for in control. With a very good career walk rate of 2.26, his 1.51 mark in 2010 helped to offset the loss in ability to strike batters out and ensured that even with such a miniscule strikeout rate, he still managed to post a 3.16 K/BB ratio. Pavano pairs his low walk/low strikeout combination with solid ground ball rates which, like his walk rate, reached a career best mark of 51.2% in 2010.
While the metrics have changed a little bit, with both the strikeout and walk rates coming down a little from his time with the Marlins and Expos, Pavano essentially remains the same pitcher he was at the start of the decade. He came out throwing in the low 90s (90.7 his first two years), and his career 5.72K / 2.26BB / and 46% GB rates are reasonably similar to what you saw in his 2010 campaign.
The problem is that with the exception of his 2004 and 2010 seasons (coincidentally both walk years) that combination has never really produced particularly impressive results. His 2010 ERA was largely the result of a somewhat beneficial .286 BABIP and a career best 74% LOB rate (along with the career best walk and ground ball rates). Like most pitchers who pitch long enough, his career ERA (4.34) and FIP/xFIP marks (4.15/4.11) match up nicely, and both suggest that Pavano is what we thought he was. A mediocre innings eater.
He's not an ace. He's not a number two.
He's more of a #3 who can be relied on to chew up innings.
Most speculation suggests that Pavano is aiming for a three-year deal that would average something in the neighborhood of 12m per season. Similarly, there is a lot of speculation that the teams interested don't want to go beyond two years. In all likelihood, a team that showed a willingness to go to three years would claim Pavano rather quickly, and I'm guessing that's what he's holding out for.
And so we wind up back at our original question, what is Carl Pavano worth?
On a pure WAR level, his average of around 3.7 WAR during his last four healthy seasons suggests he's certainly worth the 12.0m he's seeking on a per annum basis, and his track record (Yankees saga aside) suggests he's worth that.
Of course, looking strictly at WAR levels can be deceiving. What teams really look at is replacement value - "how much better is player B compared to player A who is already on my team)".
In the Twins case, the most likely player to be replaced would be Kevin Slowey. Slowey is a capable pitcher (6.86K/1.50BB - 31.6%GB) in his own right, though he suffers from being one of the most fly-ball prone pitchers in the league. He also struggles to pitch deep into games, but still managed to log 155 innings in just 28 starts, not a terrible mark, but still almost 70 fewer innings than Pavano logged last year.
With a depleted bullpen, those extra 50-70 innings that Pavano could provide become more significant, as it essentially removes an entire reliever from the equation. In the Twins case, a reliever that's likely to trend toward replacement level.
Replacing Slowey with Pavano will, without a doubt, make the Twins better. It may also help offset some of the cost of Pavano if the Twins were to subsequently trade Slowey and the 2.5m I expect him to get in arbitration. Or perhaps the Twins could look to move Brian Duensing back to the bullpen, and bolster a group left with little beyond Joe Nathan and Matt Capps. They've got some options.
The flip side of course is that Pavano will almost certainly not be as good in 2011 as he was in 2010. His peripherals don't support such sustained success and therefor, you ultimately end up paying an extra 8-10m (the approximate difference between Slowey's 2.5m and Pavano's 10-12m) for an extra 50-70 innings of work from your rotation.
What if, instead of investing 12m into Pavano for 2010, the Twins were to instead spend 8m on a pair of free agent relievers by bringing back Jon Rauch and bringing in Arthur Rhodes? That pair would give manager Ron Gardenhire five options out of his bullpen ranging from decent (Jose Mijares) to amazing (Nathan) - and overall, provide the Twins with approximately 100 innings of work that's likely to be as good, or better, than what they'd get from Pavano.
As with any player move there are dozens of factors that need to be considered. But it's my opinion that the Twins could spend 10-12m in ways that would make more sense than making a marginal improvement at starting pitcher.
Tigers Bring Back Magglio Ordonez
With his teams greatest needs - catching and bullpen help - completed, and outfield stars Carl Crawford and Jayson Werth signed away on absurd contracts, Tigers General Manager Dave Dombrowski has made perhaps the Tigers last significant signing of the off season by bringing back long-time right fielder and former MVP Magglio Ordonez on a one-year, ten million dollar deal.
After a down 2009 season, there was a lot of hand-wringing within the Tigers fanbase about whether or not he'd be a capable option for the team in 2010. In detailing players who needed to bounce back last March, I identified Magglio Ordonez as one of the two candidates on the Tigers, surmising;
In general, that was precisely the case as Ordonez posted a .852 OPS. Not quite a return to his previously prodigious levels of production, but well above average all the same. Perhaps just as importantly, Ordonez seemed to bounce back a bit defensively too, posting a UZR/150 of +2.8. Ordonez has never been a standout with the glove, and all of the advanced defensive metrics has suggested as much since around 2007. Particularly alarming is we're the back-to-back -12 UZR/150 seasons Ordonez had in 2008 and 2009. Ordonez's defense was so bad that in 2009, despite posting a still solid .804 OPS, he was worth just 1.5 WAR.
So to see Magglio have a solid offensive bounce-back and to see him posting better defensive marks was certainly encouraging. Unfortunately, he went down mid-way through the year with a broken ankle and managed to log only about 60% of a full seasons worth of plate appearances. It was a disappointing end to a season that could've seen him rack up a WAR of 4.0 or so and perhaps propelled him to one last big-dollar multi-year deal.
Of course, player contracts are a zero-sum game and in this case, Magglio's loss could be the Tigers gain as his injury might have allowed Dombrowski to make perhaps the off season's best free agent signing. In a winter that's seen outfielders near thirty (or over) getting seven year deals, a multitude of relievers being handed three-year contracts that almost never work out, and multi-year deals for middling position players - the Tigers signed a legitimate 4 WAR candidate for just one year at a rate (10.0m) that actually trends toward the lower end of his possible production level.
Obviously Ordonez, who will be 37 during the 2011 season is no spring chicken. And though he may be a shell of the player that just four seasons ago was the AL MVP after a monster season, he's still capable of producing .300/.380/.480 - .860 offense and, depending upon how his ankle heals, and how successful his rehab is, could be at least around league average defensively.
In other words, for six fewer years, and 116m dollars less than the Nationals will be giving Jayson Werth - the Tigers stand a solid chance of getting about 80% of the production in 2010. That's the definition of a savvy signing.
After a down 2009 season, there was a lot of hand-wringing within the Tigers fanbase about whether or not he'd be a capable option for the team in 2010. In detailing players who needed to bounce back last March, I identified Magglio Ordonez as one of the two candidates on the Tigers, surmising;
"...while there was a significant decline in power production, there wasn't much change in Ordonez' ancillary numbers. His strikeout, walks, and line drive rates remain essentially unchanged. The one huge difference was in ground ball rate. Magglio, as is the case with most power hitters, has always been an extreme fly ball hitter. Last year that changed radically as his ground ball rate shot up to 51% from a career rate of 44.2%.Let's forget the last part about a lineup I expected to surprise people and focus on the GOOD prognostication about Ordonez having a solid bounce-back year shall we?
To me, that suggests a mechanical issue, and mechanical issues can be fixed with good coaching. I'd be far more concerned if we were seeing declines in the other numbers, as that would suggest lower bat speed, or declining ability to recognize and react to pitches. We don't see any of that. With a fine spring training under his belt where he mashed six extra base hits along with a pair of homers in just 51 at-bats, I'd expect Magglio to produce just fine in the middle of the Tigers order and provide a lot more run producing power to a lineup I think will surprise a lot of people in 2009."
In general, that was precisely the case as Ordonez posted a .852 OPS. Not quite a return to his previously prodigious levels of production, but well above average all the same. Perhaps just as importantly, Ordonez seemed to bounce back a bit defensively too, posting a UZR/150 of +2.8. Ordonez has never been a standout with the glove, and all of the advanced defensive metrics has suggested as much since around 2007. Particularly alarming is we're the back-to-back -12 UZR/150 seasons Ordonez had in 2008 and 2009. Ordonez's defense was so bad that in 2009, despite posting a still solid .804 OPS, he was worth just 1.5 WAR.
So to see Magglio have a solid offensive bounce-back and to see him posting better defensive marks was certainly encouraging. Unfortunately, he went down mid-way through the year with a broken ankle and managed to log only about 60% of a full seasons worth of plate appearances. It was a disappointing end to a season that could've seen him rack up a WAR of 4.0 or so and perhaps propelled him to one last big-dollar multi-year deal.
Of course, player contracts are a zero-sum game and in this case, Magglio's loss could be the Tigers gain as his injury might have allowed Dombrowski to make perhaps the off season's best free agent signing. In a winter that's seen outfielders near thirty (or over) getting seven year deals, a multitude of relievers being handed three-year contracts that almost never work out, and multi-year deals for middling position players - the Tigers signed a legitimate 4 WAR candidate for just one year at a rate (10.0m) that actually trends toward the lower end of his possible production level.
Obviously Ordonez, who will be 37 during the 2011 season is no spring chicken. And though he may be a shell of the player that just four seasons ago was the AL MVP after a monster season, he's still capable of producing .300/.380/.480 - .860 offense and, depending upon how his ankle heals, and how successful his rehab is, could be at least around league average defensively.
In other words, for six fewer years, and 116m dollars less than the Nationals will be giving Jayson Werth - the Tigers stand a solid chance of getting about 80% of the production in 2010. That's the definition of a savvy signing.
Thursday, December 16, 2010
White Sox Sign Jesse Crain
Seriously Kenny Williams? Seriously?
Ok, first of all, let me say that I really like Jesse Crain as a person and as a baseball player, and I'm going to gush a bit.
As a person, I respect the heck out of him for doing everything his organization have asked of him. I respect him for facing down the two surgeries with the highest washout rates for pitchers in baseball - rotator cuff and labrum - at the same time. And not flinching. Baseball is a game that can be played by anyone, but only a select few can tread the dangerously thin line that separates a Minor Leaguer from a Major Leaguer and tread right. The margin for error is simply too small. So to make it back from both of those injuries is impressive in any regard. That he tackled both at once and succeeded is border-line unbelievable.
As a player, I really like his stuff. He features two very solid offerings - a straight fastball that clocked in at 94.8mph in 2010, and a late-breaking slider with hard bite at 85.5mph. He'll also show hitters the occasional curve at 75.5mph. Those strong pitches allowed him to punch out 8.21 batters per nine in 2010.
While the fastball has good life, it's lack of vertical or horizontal movement makes it a pretty hittable pitch and throughout his career, it's ranked as his most hittable offering and came in at 1.13 runs BELOW average per 100 pitches in 2010. His slider has consistently been his best offering, and came in at 2.91 runs ABOVE average last year.
Where Jesse really struggles however, is in control. It's not that his walk rates are THAT bad - 3.57/9IP in 2010 - but they aren't great either. Worse, he has a tendency to miss IN the strikezone which, paired with generally mediocre ground ball rates - 39.2% in 2010 - leads to his fair share of home runs.
If White Sox fans are thinking that sounds familiar, it's because it is. Indeed, the Sox just traded away a player with strikingly similar peripherals in Scott Linebrink. They did so only to sign Crain to yet another three year deal after watching the one given to Linebrink explode on them to the extent that they had to pay the Braves 3.0m to take him on while getting back a paltry return.
This is where my, "Seriously Kenny..." bit comes in to play.
It's not that either Crain or Linebrink are BAD pitchers. Hardly. They both have above average stuff, both struggle somewhat with their command, and both are somewhat flyball prone. Furthermore, their issues with fly-balls were generally negated to some extent with their previous teams (Twins/Padres) as they played in pitcher friendly stadiums. When Linebrink moved into the hitters paradise that is US Cellular, he started giving up home runs at an astonishing rate.
I'm not projecting the same thing will happen with Crain - his ground ball rates are generally 5-8% better. But Crain also doesn't have nearly the track record of success that the Linebrink does, and a flat fastball like his is going to make him homer prone regardless of where he pitches.
I would've thought that seeing one three year deal for a reliever not work out as hoped would've perhaps highlighted the fact that giving relievers - who are notoriously unreliable - such long deals is ill-advised. Especially when that player has really only had one good year since recovering from multiple career-threatening injuries. But I guess that's why no one can ever guess what Kenny Williams is going to do. Because too often, much of it baffles everyone else. Lots of times in good ways. But I just can't see this being one of them.
I like Jesse Crain, a lot. I think he's a very solid pitcher. I think he'll continue to be a solid pitcher. But I also think White Sox fans are going to dislike him in short order because he's going to be asked to do something he's probably not well-equipped to do. Be a setup man in a ball park that really doesn't fit him. That won't be Jesse's fault of course - a man can't be something other than what he is - but will it lead some to question Williams' free agent strategies?
Kenny is taking a lot of high-risk, high-cost gambles this off season to try and get his club back into the playoffs. But if they don't pan out, he's going to be left with a lot of ugly looking contracts in 2012 and beyond and he'll be leaving his franchise hamstrung.
If Kenny Williams were a poker player I'd say he's got a J-Q off-suit and is hoping to pull a flush. It could work out really nice, or end up costing him a lot.
Ok, first of all, let me say that I really like Jesse Crain as a person and as a baseball player, and I'm going to gush a bit.
As a person, I respect the heck out of him for doing everything his organization have asked of him. I respect him for facing down the two surgeries with the highest washout rates for pitchers in baseball - rotator cuff and labrum - at the same time. And not flinching. Baseball is a game that can be played by anyone, but only a select few can tread the dangerously thin line that separates a Minor Leaguer from a Major Leaguer and tread right. The margin for error is simply too small. So to make it back from both of those injuries is impressive in any regard. That he tackled both at once and succeeded is border-line unbelievable.
As a player, I really like his stuff. He features two very solid offerings - a straight fastball that clocked in at 94.8mph in 2010, and a late-breaking slider with hard bite at 85.5mph. He'll also show hitters the occasional curve at 75.5mph. Those strong pitches allowed him to punch out 8.21 batters per nine in 2010.
While the fastball has good life, it's lack of vertical or horizontal movement makes it a pretty hittable pitch and throughout his career, it's ranked as his most hittable offering and came in at 1.13 runs BELOW average per 100 pitches in 2010. His slider has consistently been his best offering, and came in at 2.91 runs ABOVE average last year.
Where Jesse really struggles however, is in control. It's not that his walk rates are THAT bad - 3.57/9IP in 2010 - but they aren't great either. Worse, he has a tendency to miss IN the strikezone which, paired with generally mediocre ground ball rates - 39.2% in 2010 - leads to his fair share of home runs.
If White Sox fans are thinking that sounds familiar, it's because it is. Indeed, the Sox just traded away a player with strikingly similar peripherals in Scott Linebrink. They did so only to sign Crain to yet another three year deal after watching the one given to Linebrink explode on them to the extent that they had to pay the Braves 3.0m to take him on while getting back a paltry return.
This is where my, "Seriously Kenny..." bit comes in to play.
It's not that either Crain or Linebrink are BAD pitchers. Hardly. They both have above average stuff, both struggle somewhat with their command, and both are somewhat flyball prone. Furthermore, their issues with fly-balls were generally negated to some extent with their previous teams (Twins/Padres) as they played in pitcher friendly stadiums. When Linebrink moved into the hitters paradise that is US Cellular, he started giving up home runs at an astonishing rate.
I'm not projecting the same thing will happen with Crain - his ground ball rates are generally 5-8% better. But Crain also doesn't have nearly the track record of success that the Linebrink does, and a flat fastball like his is going to make him homer prone regardless of where he pitches.
I would've thought that seeing one three year deal for a reliever not work out as hoped would've perhaps highlighted the fact that giving relievers - who are notoriously unreliable - such long deals is ill-advised. Especially when that player has really only had one good year since recovering from multiple career-threatening injuries. But I guess that's why no one can ever guess what Kenny Williams is going to do. Because too often, much of it baffles everyone else. Lots of times in good ways. But I just can't see this being one of them.
I like Jesse Crain, a lot. I think he's a very solid pitcher. I think he'll continue to be a solid pitcher. But I also think White Sox fans are going to dislike him in short order because he's going to be asked to do something he's probably not well-equipped to do. Be a setup man in a ball park that really doesn't fit him. That won't be Jesse's fault of course - a man can't be something other than what he is - but will it lead some to question Williams' free agent strategies?
Kenny is taking a lot of high-risk, high-cost gambles this off season to try and get his club back into the playoffs. But if they don't pan out, he's going to be left with a lot of ugly looking contracts in 2012 and beyond and he'll be leaving his franchise hamstrung.
If Kenny Williams were a poker player I'd say he's got a J-Q off-suit and is hoping to pull a flush. It could work out really nice, or end up costing him a lot.
Twins Deal Hardy and Harris to Orioles For Bullpen Help - And I Rail On Multi-Year Deals For Fringy Positional Players
With his team nearing a payroll of 105m and without having resigned any of their departing free agents (less Jason Repko), Twins General Manager Bill Smith knew he had a lot of holes to fill and not a ton of money to fill those holes with. While we don't know exactly what the Twins 2010 payroll will look like, my best guess is in the 110m range, perhaps as much as 115m. Either way, the Twins were pressed for payroll flexibility given catcher Joe Mauer's significant raise and a number of players due to receive raises via arbitration.
It's with that in mind that it would seem the Twins made a bit of asalary dump move to gain payroll flexibility by dealing off starting shortstop J.J. Hardy and utility man Brendan Harris.
Harris, who is essentially the definition of a replacement level player had a terrible 2010 before clearing waivers and being demoted early and never making it back. That would seem to put a cap on what was a weird contract for Bill Smith to give out in the first place - a two year, $3.5m deal to a replacement level player entering his arbitration years. I railed on GM's giving out three year contracts a few days ago when discussing the Tigers signing of Joaquin Benoit (I'll have more ranting soon when I get to the Jesse Crain signing) - so let me now rail on GM's who give out multi-year deals of any sort to fringe level position players. The Twins did it with Harris and Nick Punto, and the White Sox are still feeling the pain of the Mark Teahan deal.
A couple things:
1) There is never any reason to sign an arbitration eligible player to a multi-year deal unless they've demonstrated consistently above-average play prior. You still own that player regardless.
2) If you have to give a fringy (1.0 WAR) free agent an extra year to sign with you - dont. Let someone else make that mistake. No matter what you think, you can almost certainly find someone else on the free agent scrap heap or on the waiver wire who will provide nearly the same production for a fraction of the cost, and with none of the multi-year headache.
Just say no... Now back to the topic at hand.
With Harris going to the Orioles (along with $500K to subsidize the move) the prime trade chip going to the Orioles, J.J. Hardy is an interesting study. Obviously for a couple of years, Hardy was one of the best shortstops in baseball, posting very solid 2007 and 2008 campaigns with solid OPS marks and his trademark great defense. But Hardy fell off the proverbial cliff following that 2008 season, posting an OPS of just .659, and was demoted by the Brewers in 2009 in favor of Alcides Escobar. He was then dealt to the Twins for Carlos Gomez during the 2009-2010 off season.
Hardy did rebound to some extent in 2010, posting a .714 OPS that was actually a fair amount above the MLB average for shortstops of .690. That above average offense, combined with his trademark standout defense was good for a solid 2.4 WAR despite appearing in just 101 games. It's perfectly feasible that Hardy, given a full season of health (a big question given his inability to stay healthy the past two seasons) could be worth as much as 3.5 WAR. Mark no mistake, the Twins just traded away a player who, in a vacuum was certainly worth every penny he was going to make in arbitration - and more.
Furthermore, the player they're most likely to replace him with, Alexi Casilla, played a big role in the Twins efforts to revamp their middle infield following a disastrous the 2009 season that saw the team receive essentially zero production from their middle infield. In that 2009, Casilla posted an OPS of just .538 - a mark that could duplicated by a decent hitting pitcher. Casilla rebounded somewhat in 2010, posting a .726 OPS in limited duty - a mark that more closely resembles his decent 2008 campaign. If Casilla can replicate his success of 2008 and 2010 over a full season, the Twins should essentially break-even offensively. However, most defensive metrics have Casilla - who came up as a shortstop - as a below average defender at second base where he's spent essentially all his time during his MLB career. If he can't manage to play at least a league average defense at shortstop, the Twins will be losing out on significant production.
It all breaks down like this:
The Twins will almost certainly be worse at shortstop. The only question is, "can Casilla's offense be respectable enough to minimize the loss?" That's a big question, and one that could ultimately end up costing the Twins 2-3 wins in 2011.
In return, the Twins receive approximately 7m in payroll room - the 6m or so Hardy was due in arb. and the 1.25m in Harris' contract that the Orioles are taking on) - and relievers Jim Hoey and Brett Jacobson.
Hoey is a survival story with has MLB experience. In 2005, he had Tommy John surgery and is one of those pitchers who came back stronger, as he added velocity after the surgery. He came back and saw limited action in both 2006 and 2007, but missed the entire 2008 season as he recovered from shoulder surgery. He's spent the last two years toiling away in the minors. Hoey has always had the stuff to strikeout batters, be it in the Minors as he's consistently racked up K rates over 10.00 but that hasn't translated to the Majors. He's also struggled with control issues throughout his career, and that hasn;t changed. He could be a 6th or 7th inning option or minor league depth for a thin bullpen like the Twins will have in 2011.
Jacobson is an interesting player. The Twins like that he has a live arm and so far, he's looked solid in the low minors, posting solid strikeout and walk rates. He's still got a ways to go, but he could eventually develop into a bullpen arm for the Twins.
It's with that in mind that it would seem the Twins made a bit of a
Harris, who is essentially the definition of a replacement level player had a terrible 2010 before clearing waivers and being demoted early and never making it back. That would seem to put a cap on what was a weird contract for Bill Smith to give out in the first place - a two year, $3.5m deal to a replacement level player entering his arbitration years. I railed on GM's giving out three year contracts a few days ago when discussing the Tigers signing of Joaquin Benoit (I'll have more ranting soon when I get to the Jesse Crain signing) - so let me now rail on GM's who give out multi-year deals of any sort to fringe level position players. The Twins did it with Harris and Nick Punto, and the White Sox are still feeling the pain of the Mark Teahan deal.
A couple things:
1) There is never any reason to sign an arbitration eligible player to a multi-year deal unless they've demonstrated consistently above-average play prior. You still own that player regardless.
2) If you have to give a fringy (1.0 WAR) free agent an extra year to sign with you - dont. Let someone else make that mistake. No matter what you think, you can almost certainly find someone else on the free agent scrap heap or on the waiver wire who will provide nearly the same production for a fraction of the cost, and with none of the multi-year headache.
Just say no... Now back to the topic at hand.
With Harris going to the Orioles (along with $500K to subsidize the move) the prime trade chip going to the Orioles, J.J. Hardy is an interesting study. Obviously for a couple of years, Hardy was one of the best shortstops in baseball, posting very solid 2007 and 2008 campaigns with solid OPS marks and his trademark great defense. But Hardy fell off the proverbial cliff following that 2008 season, posting an OPS of just .659, and was demoted by the Brewers in 2009 in favor of Alcides Escobar. He was then dealt to the Twins for Carlos Gomez during the 2009-2010 off season.
Hardy did rebound to some extent in 2010, posting a .714 OPS that was actually a fair amount above the MLB average for shortstops of .690. That above average offense, combined with his trademark standout defense was good for a solid 2.4 WAR despite appearing in just 101 games. It's perfectly feasible that Hardy, given a full season of health (a big question given his inability to stay healthy the past two seasons) could be worth as much as 3.5 WAR. Mark no mistake, the Twins just traded away a player who, in a vacuum was certainly worth every penny he was going to make in arbitration - and more.
Furthermore, the player they're most likely to replace him with, Alexi Casilla, played a big role in the Twins efforts to revamp their middle infield following a disastrous the 2009 season that saw the team receive essentially zero production from their middle infield. In that 2009, Casilla posted an OPS of just .538 - a mark that could duplicated by a decent hitting pitcher. Casilla rebounded somewhat in 2010, posting a .726 OPS in limited duty - a mark that more closely resembles his decent 2008 campaign. If Casilla can replicate his success of 2008 and 2010 over a full season, the Twins should essentially break-even offensively. However, most defensive metrics have Casilla - who came up as a shortstop - as a below average defender at second base where he's spent essentially all his time during his MLB career. If he can't manage to play at least a league average defense at shortstop, the Twins will be losing out on significant production.
It all breaks down like this:
The Twins will almost certainly be worse at shortstop. The only question is, "can Casilla's offense be respectable enough to minimize the loss?" That's a big question, and one that could ultimately end up costing the Twins 2-3 wins in 2011.
In return, the Twins receive approximately 7m in payroll room - the 6m or so Hardy was due in arb. and the 1.25m in Harris' contract that the Orioles are taking on) - and relievers Jim Hoey and Brett Jacobson.
Hoey is a survival story with has MLB experience. In 2005, he had Tommy John surgery and is one of those pitchers who came back stronger, as he added velocity after the surgery. He came back and saw limited action in both 2006 and 2007, but missed the entire 2008 season as he recovered from shoulder surgery. He's spent the last two years toiling away in the minors. Hoey has always had the stuff to strikeout batters, be it in the Minors as he's consistently racked up K rates over 10.00 but that hasn't translated to the Majors. He's also struggled with control issues throughout his career, and that hasn;t changed. He could be a 6th or 7th inning option or minor league depth for a thin bullpen like the Twins will have in 2011.
Jacobson is an interesting player. The Twins like that he has a live arm and so far, he's looked solid in the low minors, posting solid strikeout and walk rates. He's still got a ways to go, but he could eventually develop into a bullpen arm for the Twins.
Monday, December 13, 2010
White Sox Sign Brian Bruney
Short on cash and long on bullpen holes, the White Sox made a move today to shore up at least one of those holes by inking hard-throwing 28 year old righty Brian Bruney to a minor league deal. Bruney, who has never had trouble missing bats split his 2010 between the Mets, Brewers, and Nationals - though he pitched in the minors for the Mets and Brewers. Prior to that, Bruney pitched for the Yankees for four seasons.
With a career 8.81 K/9 and a fastball that works in the mid-90s he's got the kind of put-away, blow-away stuff teams seek out of their middle relievers, but his control has been extremely bad. During his MLB tenure he's walked 6.51 batters per nine innings. Pair that with a poor fly ball rate and it leaves him very susceptible to big innings and he could end up being a particularly poor fit for a small park like US cellular. While Bruney will never have even average command, perhaps the Sox can iron out some of his control issues and turn him into something serviceable.
With a career 8.81 K/9 and a fastball that works in the mid-90s he's got the kind of put-away, blow-away stuff teams seek out of their middle relievers, but his control has been extremely bad. During his MLB tenure he's walked 6.51 batters per nine innings. Pair that with a poor fly ball rate and it leaves him very susceptible to big innings and he could end up being a particularly poor fit for a small park like US cellular. While Bruney will never have even average command, perhaps the Sox can iron out some of his control issues and turn him into something serviceable.
Saturday, December 11, 2010
White Sox Dump Scott Linebrink and I Rail Against Long-Term Deals For Relievers
Following the 2007 season, the White Sox, needing help in their bullpen took the rather extraordinary step of extending a four year nineteen million dollar contract to relief pitcher Scott Linebrink. Despite having a bit of a down year in 2007, the White Sox were undeterred and instead invested in Linebrink's history of strong performances. Over the preceding four seasons, Linebrink put up some very strong rate stats: 8.0K/9 - 2.8BB/9 - 1.0HR/9 to go with workhorse numbers from a reliever as he racked up over 300IP in those four years. But perhaps the White Sox overlooked something important in that HR rate however, because as someone with GB rates consistently in the mid 30s, Linebrink was a heavily fly ball prone pitcher.
After spending so much time pitching in the hitters hell that is Petco Park, the move to US Cellular has proven brutal and Linebrink's home run numbers sky rocketed. It is in that regard alone where Linebrink had seen significant decline as his HR rate nearly doubled from one park to the next. The propensity for the long-ball made Linebrink a questionable late-inning option for White Sox and a favorite for fans angst. That strikes me as unfortunate, because Linebrink, for his part, never did anything differently.
In the end however, it was circumstances largely beyond Linebrink's control that led to his trade. Chiefly, the White Sox needed payroll flexibility to resign Paul Konerko. The Braves were ready and waiting and they may have made a gem of a trade because in picking up Linebrink's strong strikeout and walk rates, they lost only middling prospect Kyle Cofield who will open 2011 as a 24 year old in AA with little success at any level of the minor leagues.
Let's be clear, while Linebrink struggled at The Cell in giving up home runs, his peripherals suggested he was still a perfectly capable reliever, especially in a 7th inning role and even in a spot setup role. This was a pure salary dump, one where the Sox were giving up a solid player, yet still needed to finance 3m of his 2011 salary. Let that be a cautionary tale to those who would be willing to sign middle relievers to long-term deals.
Even the best middle relievers - all relievers actually, closers included - are replaceable. That's a result of the fact that they pitch relatively few innings and because finding capable options can be done quite easily either internally, or right off the free agent scrap heap. The teams that realize this and eschew giving out those long-term deals are the ones who will ultimately not find themselves in the position of needing to finance the departure of a solid player like the White Sox just needed to do.
After spending so much time pitching in the hitters hell that is Petco Park, the move to US Cellular has proven brutal and Linebrink's home run numbers sky rocketed. It is in that regard alone where Linebrink had seen significant decline as his HR rate nearly doubled from one park to the next. The propensity for the long-ball made Linebrink a questionable late-inning option for White Sox and a favorite for fans angst. That strikes me as unfortunate, because Linebrink, for his part, never did anything differently.
In the end however, it was circumstances largely beyond Linebrink's control that led to his trade. Chiefly, the White Sox needed payroll flexibility to resign Paul Konerko. The Braves were ready and waiting and they may have made a gem of a trade because in picking up Linebrink's strong strikeout and walk rates, they lost only middling prospect Kyle Cofield who will open 2011 as a 24 year old in AA with little success at any level of the minor leagues.
Let's be clear, while Linebrink struggled at The Cell in giving up home runs, his peripherals suggested he was still a perfectly capable reliever, especially in a 7th inning role and even in a spot setup role. This was a pure salary dump, one where the Sox were giving up a solid player, yet still needed to finance 3m of his 2011 salary. Let that be a cautionary tale to those who would be willing to sign middle relievers to long-term deals.
Even the best middle relievers - all relievers actually, closers included - are replaceable. That's a result of the fact that they pitch relatively few innings and because finding capable options can be done quite easily either internally, or right off the free agent scrap heap. The teams that realize this and eschew giving out those long-term deals are the ones who will ultimately not find themselves in the position of needing to finance the departure of a solid player like the White Sox just needed to do.
Friday, December 10, 2010
White Sox Bring Back A.J. Pierzynski
After six seasons of his patented instigation antics behind the plate for the White Sox, A.J. Pierzynski found himself as a free agent for the first time since the end of the 2004 season. To make matter worse, he was coming off his worst offensive performance of the millennium (hey, it's fun to say!) after posting an OPS of just .688. Thankfully for A.J., the crop of free agent catchers wasn't overwhelmingly attractive, perhaps being headlined by the defensively challenged John Buck. Once he was signed away by the Marlins early on, there was little else behind him.
Re-enter Kenny Williams.
With his lone remaining catcher under contract being the light-hitting, defensive minded Ramon Castro, and his best minor league option, Tyler Flowers, struggling at AAA with his plate discipline and defense, Williams made the bold move of bringing Pierzynski back on a back-loaded two-year contract that would prove to be the final domino that remained to fall prior to Williams being able to make his push to re-sign long-time first baseman Paul Konerko.
As with many free-agent signings, this one, at least on it's face, appears to be reasonable. Pierzynski has been worth 2.4 and 1.8 WAR the past two seasons - and at an average of of 4m per season, should easily justify his contract.
But as I highlighted in my review of the Victor Martinez signing by Detroit earlier, catchers have shown a propensity to drop off offensively earlier than their counterparts who play other, less physically demanding positions. That's likely a result of the wear and tear on a players knees and back that a catcher must deal with. Irregardless, it's a fact of life for most players. Of course, there are exceptions, such as the seemingly ageless Jorge Posada who, despite a massive decline in defense the past four seasons, has remained a very solid contributor on offense. But the rare case of an ageless Posada shouldn't cloud our judgement of the manner in which the position as a whole has aged throughout the years, signing Pierzynki - who has just one season with an OPS over .730 in the past four years - is a risk.
Thankfully to say, the risks are at least somewhat mitigated by the fact that the deal is just for two years and rarely has a team been done-in by such a short-term deal. And lets be clear, the White Sox aren't going to suffer significantly even if Pierzynski continues to hit as poorly as he did last year.
Rather, my concerns on this signing are rather nuanced. But that doesn't make them any less relevant.
First of all, I question the need to go to two years. How many other teams were in on the bidding? It's always tough to say, but from reports, the only team that seemed to have clear interest was the Blue Jays (whom the aforementioned Buck was departing). But when we look at the Jays, we see that they have a solid MLB-ready prospect in J.P. Arencibia and another in Travis D'Arnaud who is probably only one or two years off.
Beyond the Blue Jays, there are very few teams with an obvious need at the position (the Red Sox, Dodgers, and maybe the Mariners stand/stood out) and even then, the number of relatively comparable players seems to outstrip demand. Indeed, the Mariners just signed former White Sox catcher Miguel Olivo - who is two years younger than Pierzynski, who has been both a better offensive player the past two years, and a much better defender throughout his career - for a million dollars less.
Was signing Pierzynski to a two year deal really necessary? Doubtful.
Furthermore, was Pierzynski really the best available option? As the signing of Olivo points out, probably not. I question whether he's even better than the man who will be backing him up. Let's be certain, Castro is probably not quite the caliber of offensive player that Pierzynski is, but he's not particularly worse and he's almost certainly a somewhat better defensive option as baserunners have stolen on Pierzysnki with near impunity the past three years, swiping 270 total bases at a 78% success rate.
Of course, there are other factors to consider. Pierzynski is a tenured member of the White Sox, a veteran of their World Series run (a "proven winner"), and a legitimate warrior behind the plate as he's donned the tools of ignorance more times than any catcher in baseball the past three seasons. He's also a major pain-in-the-ass for the opposing teams hitters.
Will the signing of AJ likely prove worthwhile? Probably. After all, even while experiencing his worst offensive year of this millennium (yup, still fun to say) he was worth 1.8 WAR. More than enough to justify an average yearly salary of 4m. And perhaps that's all that should matter. But for me, the little things matter. And there are little things about this deal that I just don't like.
I think the Sox could've done better. And could've done better for less.
Re-enter Kenny Williams.
With his lone remaining catcher under contract being the light-hitting, defensive minded Ramon Castro, and his best minor league option, Tyler Flowers, struggling at AAA with his plate discipline and defense, Williams made the bold move of bringing Pierzynski back on a back-loaded two-year contract that would prove to be the final domino that remained to fall prior to Williams being able to make his push to re-sign long-time first baseman Paul Konerko.
As with many free-agent signings, this one, at least on it's face, appears to be reasonable. Pierzynski has been worth 2.4 and 1.8 WAR the past two seasons - and at an average of of 4m per season, should easily justify his contract.
But as I highlighted in my review of the Victor Martinez signing by Detroit earlier, catchers have shown a propensity to drop off offensively earlier than their counterparts who play other, less physically demanding positions. That's likely a result of the wear and tear on a players knees and back that a catcher must deal with. Irregardless, it's a fact of life for most players. Of course, there are exceptions, such as the seemingly ageless Jorge Posada who, despite a massive decline in defense the past four seasons, has remained a very solid contributor on offense. But the rare case of an ageless Posada shouldn't cloud our judgement of the manner in which the position as a whole has aged throughout the years, signing Pierzynki - who has just one season with an OPS over .730 in the past four years - is a risk.
Thankfully to say, the risks are at least somewhat mitigated by the fact that the deal is just for two years and rarely has a team been done-in by such a short-term deal. And lets be clear, the White Sox aren't going to suffer significantly even if Pierzynski continues to hit as poorly as he did last year.
Rather, my concerns on this signing are rather nuanced. But that doesn't make them any less relevant.
First of all, I question the need to go to two years. How many other teams were in on the bidding? It's always tough to say, but from reports, the only team that seemed to have clear interest was the Blue Jays (whom the aforementioned Buck was departing). But when we look at the Jays, we see that they have a solid MLB-ready prospect in J.P. Arencibia and another in Travis D'Arnaud who is probably only one or two years off.
Beyond the Blue Jays, there are very few teams with an obvious need at the position (the Red Sox, Dodgers, and maybe the Mariners stand/stood out) and even then, the number of relatively comparable players seems to outstrip demand. Indeed, the Mariners just signed former White Sox catcher Miguel Olivo - who is two years younger than Pierzynski, who has been both a better offensive player the past two years, and a much better defender throughout his career - for a million dollars less.
Was signing Pierzynski to a two year deal really necessary? Doubtful.
Furthermore, was Pierzynski really the best available option? As the signing of Olivo points out, probably not. I question whether he's even better than the man who will be backing him up. Let's be certain, Castro is probably not quite the caliber of offensive player that Pierzynski is, but he's not particularly worse and he's almost certainly a somewhat better defensive option as baserunners have stolen on Pierzysnki with near impunity the past three years, swiping 270 total bases at a 78% success rate.
Of course, there are other factors to consider. Pierzynski is a tenured member of the White Sox, a veteran of their World Series run (a "proven winner"), and a legitimate warrior behind the plate as he's donned the tools of ignorance more times than any catcher in baseball the past three seasons. He's also a major pain-in-the-ass for the opposing teams hitters.
Will the signing of AJ likely prove worthwhile? Probably. After all, even while experiencing his worst offensive year of this millennium (yup, still fun to say) he was worth 1.8 WAR. More than enough to justify an average yearly salary of 4m. And perhaps that's all that should matter. But for me, the little things matter. And there are little things about this deal that I just don't like.
I think the Sox could've done better. And could've done better for less.
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Tigers Payroll Estimate #2
This estimate reflects only players who are currently under team control for the 2011 season. It does not include any speculation on players who will be signed via free agency or those who will be acquired via trade. This list will change as the off season progress, and players are acquired, or lost.
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed Catcher Victor Martinez for 4y/50m: 12.0m (2011) / 13.0m (2012+2013) / 12.0m (2014)
- Signed Reliever Joaquin Benoit for 3y/16.5m: 5.5m per year.
C) Victor Martinez - 12.0m
1B) Miguel Cabrera - 20.0m
2B) Scott Sizemore - 450k
3B) Brandon Inge - 5.5m
SS) Johnny Peralta - 5.25m
LF) Ryan Raburn - 1.5m*
CF) Austin Jackson - 450k
RF) Brennan Boesch - 450k
DH) Carlos Guillen - 13.0m
BN) Ramon Santiago - 1.25m
BN) Don Kelly - 450k
BN) Casper Wells - 450k
BN) Alex Avila - 450k
SP) Justin Verlander - 12.85m
SP) Max Scherzer - 450k
SP) Rick Porcello - 1.535m
SP) Armando Gallaraga - 1.5m*
SP) Phil Coke - 450k
RP) Daniel Schlereth - 450k
RP) Zach Miner - 1.5m*
RP) Fu-Te Ni - 450k
RP) Ryan Perry - 450k
RP) Joel Zumaya - 1.5m*
RP) Joaquin Beniot - 5.5m
RP) Jose Valverde - 7.0m
MiLB Costs:
Jacob Turner - 1.175m
Total: 96.01m
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed Catcher Victor Martinez for 4y/50m: 12.0m (2011) / 13.0m (2012+2013) / 12.0m (2014)
- Signed Reliever Joaquin Benoit for 3y/16.5m: 5.5m per year.
C) Victor Martinez - 12.0m
1B) Miguel Cabrera - 20.0m
2B) Scott Sizemore - 450k
3B) Brandon Inge - 5.5m
SS) Johnny Peralta - 5.25m
LF) Ryan Raburn - 1.5m*
CF) Austin Jackson - 450k
RF) Brennan Boesch - 450k
DH) Carlos Guillen - 13.0m
BN) Ramon Santiago - 1.25m
BN) Don Kelly - 450k
BN) Casper Wells - 450k
BN) Alex Avila - 450k
SP) Justin Verlander - 12.85m
SP) Max Scherzer - 450k
SP) Rick Porcello - 1.535m
SP) Armando Gallaraga - 1.5m*
SP) Phil Coke - 450k
RP) Daniel Schlereth - 450k
RP) Zach Miner - 1.5m*
RP) Fu-Te Ni - 450k
RP) Ryan Perry - 450k
RP) Joel Zumaya - 1.5m*
RP) Joaquin Beniot - 5.5m
RP) Jose Valverde - 7.0m
MiLB Costs:
Jacob Turner - 1.175m
Total: 96.01m
White Sox Payroll Estimate #2
This estimate reflects only players who are currently under team control for the 2011 season. It does not include any speculation on players who will be signed via free agency or those who will be acquired via trade. This list will change as the off season progress, and players are acquired, or lost.
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed 1B/LF/DH Adam Dunn for 4y/56m: 12m (2011) / 14m (2012) / 15m (2013 and 2014)
- Signed Catcher A.J. Pierzynski for 2y/8m: 2m (2011) / 6m (2012)
- Signed First Baseman Paul Konerko for 3y/37.5m: 12m (2011 and 2012) / 13.5m (2013)
- Traded relief pitcher Scott Linebrink to Braves: 1y/5.5m (Sox sent 3m to cover part of Linebrink's salary)
- Non-tendered closer Bobby Jenks
C) A.J. Pierzynski - 2.0m
1B) Paul Konerko - 12.0m
2B) Gordon Beckham - 450k
3B) Brent Morel - 450k
SS) Alexi Ramirez - 2.75m
LF) Juan Pierre - 8.5m
CF) Alex Rios - 12.5m
RF) Carlos Quentin - 5.0m*
DH) Adam Dunn - 12.0m
BN) Dayan Viciedo - 2.25m
BN) Omar Vizquel - 1.75m
BN) Mark Teahan - 4.75m*
BN) Ramon Castro - 1.2m
SP) Jake Peavy- 16.0m
SP) Mark Buehrle - 14.0m
SP) Edwin Jackson - 8.75m
SP) John Danks - 5.5m*
SP) Gavin Floyd - 5.0m
RP)
RP)
RP)
RP) Tony Pena - 1.5m*
RP) Sergio Santos - 450k
RP) Chris Sale - 450k
RP) Matt Thornton - 3.0m
Other:
Scott Linebrink - 3m
Total: 123.25m
The positions in many cases are speculative. If I pencil in a player at a position who did not start there in 2010, it may be because I simply feel he would be the most qualified should 2011 begin today. It does not mean I expect the team to enter the 2011 season with said player manning that positon, so don't read into it too much.
An asterisk denotes an arbitration eligible player and my estimate at what they'll receive. Please note that this is not an exact figure, but should be close.
*Update*
- Signed 1B/LF/DH Adam Dunn for 4y/56m: 12m (2011) / 14m (2012) / 15m (2013 and 2014)
- Signed Catcher A.J. Pierzynski for 2y/8m: 2m (2011) / 6m (2012)
- Signed First Baseman Paul Konerko for 3y/37.5m: 12m (2011 and 2012) / 13.5m (2013)
- Traded relief pitcher Scott Linebrink to Braves: 1y/5.5m (Sox sent 3m to cover part of Linebrink's salary)
- Non-tendered closer Bobby Jenks
C) A.J. Pierzynski - 2.0m
1B) Paul Konerko - 12.0m
2B) Gordon Beckham - 450k
3B) Brent Morel - 450k
SS) Alexi Ramirez - 2.75m
LF) Juan Pierre - 8.5m
CF) Alex Rios - 12.5m
RF) Carlos Quentin - 5.0m*
DH) Adam Dunn - 12.0m
BN) Dayan Viciedo - 2.25m
BN) Omar Vizquel - 1.75m
BN) Mark Teahan - 4.75m*
BN) Ramon Castro - 1.2m
SP) Jake Peavy- 16.0m
SP) Mark Buehrle - 14.0m
SP) Edwin Jackson - 8.75m
SP) John Danks - 5.5m*
SP) Gavin Floyd - 5.0m
RP)
RP)
RP)
RP) Tony Pena - 1.5m*
RP) Sergio Santos - 450k
RP) Chris Sale - 450k
RP) Matt Thornton - 3.0m
Other:
Scott Linebrink - 3m
Total: 123.25m
White Sox Bring Back Paul Konerko
It had been apparent throughout the off season that the White Sox wanted to retain their free agent first baseman Paul Konerko. General Manager Kenny Williams wasn't shy about this, nor was team Owner and President Jerry Reinsdorf, with whom Konerko is said to share a very good relationship. Even so, everyone knew that payroll was going to be tight and that the team had other holes to fill. But today, with the other holes having been filled - notably at DH with the acquisition of Adam Dunn - the Sox resigned Konerko.
Good relationship with management and ownership aside, this wasn't an easy sign and Kenny himself said that this nearly didn't happen. Williams has put his club in a tough fiscal position with a number of expensive contracts on the books for a lot of questionable players, be it Alex Rios, Jake Peavy, Mark Teahan, or until recently, Scott Linebrink. Even with back-loading the contracts recently given out to Dunn and AJ Pierzynski, non-tendering long-time closer Bobby Jenks, and trading off 2m of Linebrink's 2011 salary to the Braves - my payroll estimate still put the Sox at 112.2m - already a team record. So to bring back Konerko the team needed some help from ownership, and they obliged in the form of a three year, $37.5m deal that will pay Konerko 12m in 2011 and 2012, and 13.5m in 2013.
In Konerko, the White Sox have signed more than just a very good hitter, they secured a player who should wind up in their teams Hall-of-Fame after spending the past 11 seasons in white and black. Aside from that however, this is a risky signing. The Sox are now committed for the next three seasons to a player in Dunn who should be kept as far away from a defensive position as possible, and another in Konerko who has generally ranked around league average at first, but whom all three of the major advanced defensive metrics rated his 2010 very poorly. His +/- was -17, his defensive runs saved (DRS) was -18, and his UZR/150 was -14.7.
It's perfectly possible that this was an aberration - defensive metrics can be hit-and-miss sometimes - but it's equally possible that Konerko has begun that defensive slide that all players eventually do. Given that he was 34 last year, that would hardly be surprising. If so, the White Sox will be carrying two players who are both better suited for DH roles, and they'll be ding so for the next three years. That's not a particularly heart-warming prospect.
It's also unlikely that Konerko's offense of 2010 will be replicated. That's partly because he's past his prime, and partly because, well, he'd never been THAT good before. If Konerko hasn't found the fountain of youth as I expect, it's far more likely that he'll perform closer to his 2009 and 2007 seasons where he posted OPS marks of .841 and .842. If we assume that his defensive decline is a fluke and he continues to perform offensively at past levels, lets say an .850 OPS, that would make Konerko a consistent 2.5 WAR sort of player.
Of course, that assumes a lot of things that are, in general, really difficult to project for an aging player. That said, we have a lot of history to look at to suggest that Konerko should be capable, at least offensively, of providing consistent production for the life of his deal. So for 37.5m dollars, the White Sox have not only locked up a solid everyday bat, they've locked up someone who, along with starter Mark Buehrle, has been the face of the Franchise for the past decade. And yes (as much as it pains me to admit it), there is some value in that which can't be measured purely by a players production statistics.
Kenny Williams still has some work to do - namely, trying to figure out who the four guys in his bullpen not named Matt Thornton and Sergio Santos are going to be. But, with some considerable help from ownership, he's accomplished his biggest goal - fortifying his lineup and bringing back a fan favorite and White Sox icon.
Good relationship with management and ownership aside, this wasn't an easy sign and Kenny himself said that this nearly didn't happen. Williams has put his club in a tough fiscal position with a number of expensive contracts on the books for a lot of questionable players, be it Alex Rios, Jake Peavy, Mark Teahan, or until recently, Scott Linebrink. Even with back-loading the contracts recently given out to Dunn and AJ Pierzynski, non-tendering long-time closer Bobby Jenks, and trading off 2m of Linebrink's 2011 salary to the Braves - my payroll estimate still put the Sox at 112.2m - already a team record. So to bring back Konerko the team needed some help from ownership, and they obliged in the form of a three year, $37.5m deal that will pay Konerko 12m in 2011 and 2012, and 13.5m in 2013.
In Konerko, the White Sox have signed more than just a very good hitter, they secured a player who should wind up in their teams Hall-of-Fame after spending the past 11 seasons in white and black. Aside from that however, this is a risky signing. The Sox are now committed for the next three seasons to a player in Dunn who should be kept as far away from a defensive position as possible, and another in Konerko who has generally ranked around league average at first, but whom all three of the major advanced defensive metrics rated his 2010 very poorly. His +/- was -17, his defensive runs saved (DRS) was -18, and his UZR/150 was -14.7.
It's perfectly possible that this was an aberration - defensive metrics can be hit-and-miss sometimes - but it's equally possible that Konerko has begun that defensive slide that all players eventually do. Given that he was 34 last year, that would hardly be surprising. If so, the White Sox will be carrying two players who are both better suited for DH roles, and they'll be ding so for the next three years. That's not a particularly heart-warming prospect.
It's also unlikely that Konerko's offense of 2010 will be replicated. That's partly because he's past his prime, and partly because, well, he'd never been THAT good before. If Konerko hasn't found the fountain of youth as I expect, it's far more likely that he'll perform closer to his 2009 and 2007 seasons where he posted OPS marks of .841 and .842. If we assume that his defensive decline is a fluke and he continues to perform offensively at past levels, lets say an .850 OPS, that would make Konerko a consistent 2.5 WAR sort of player.
Of course, that assumes a lot of things that are, in general, really difficult to project for an aging player. That said, we have a lot of history to look at to suggest that Konerko should be capable, at least offensively, of providing consistent production for the life of his deal. So for 37.5m dollars, the White Sox have not only locked up a solid everyday bat, they've locked up someone who, along with starter Mark Buehrle, has been the face of the Franchise for the past decade. And yes (as much as it pains me to admit it), there is some value in that which can't be measured purely by a players production statistics.
Kenny Williams still has some work to do - namely, trying to figure out who the four guys in his bullpen not named Matt Thornton and Sergio Santos are going to be. But, with some considerable help from ownership, he's accomplished his biggest goal - fortifying his lineup and bringing back a fan favorite and White Sox icon.
Tuesday, December 7, 2010
Twins Win Bidding For Tsuyoshi Nishioka
The Twins moved aggressive during the 2009-2010 off season to shore up weaknesses in the middle infield as they had struggled mightily to get production from those positions. First, GM Bill Smith moved quickly to pry JJ Hardy away from the Brewers for Carlos Gomez. Then he played the waiting game and came away with Orlando Hudson at a reasonable price.
While both Hudson and Hardy struggled throughout the year with injuries and didn't come close to realizing their full offensive potential, the layout proved beneficial as the Twins, with help from those two additions, vaulted to 94 wins in 2010. Now a year later the team will watch as Hudson departs via free agency and the decision on what to do with Hardy becomes complicated.
In an attempt to create some stability, the Twins placed their bid for NPB League MVP Tsuyoshi Nishioka. On November 26th came up the winners of the exclusive negotiation rights when the Chiba Lotte Marines accepted the Twins 5.6m bid. That gave the Twins a 30 day time frame to complete a deal with Nishioka. Should they be unable to complete the deal, the bid would be refunded.
As a general rule of thumb, players tend to sign contracts that are generally in line with their bids. Diasuke Matsuzaka signed a 50m deal after a winning bid of 51.1m, for example. Expectations are that the Twins should eventually be able to agree on a deal of around 3y/9m. Such a deal would secure Nishioka through his age 29 season.
Nishioka is regarded as a good defensive player at both shortstop and second base with good range and a solid/average arm, though more than one source has speculated that his arm would play better at second than short in the Majors. He does struggle with errors, but that should be more than made up for by his above average range. And, as long as Hardy is with the Twins (and that might not be for much longer) he'll almost certainly be slotted in at second.
Offensively Nishioka is harder to peg. There has been much talk about the fact that he topped Ichiro's single-season hit record, but little mention of his past as an injury plagued league average player. At his best, he's a player who will hit for solid averages, draw some walks, steal some bases, and slap the ball around while using the gaps for his extra base power. He does have enough power to project for a handful of home runs, but the elongated leg kick that he and so many other Japanese players utilize doesn't translate well to the Major Leagues and it's likely he'll need to drop that, which could diminish his power further. Think, .300/.375/.425 - .800.
The problem is that Japanese players, outside of Ichiro and Hideki Matsui, have struggled to translate their offensive talents at the Major League level. Couple that with the fact that, until last year, Nishioka was a fairly average player who struggled to stay healthy and there is some legitimate downside. He could certainly wash out the way a much more accomplished Kaz Matsui did and prove to be nothing more than an error prone, low OPS second baseman.
Thankfully from the Twins perspective, they won't be paying him like a legitimate star. Rather, they'll be paying him like a replacement-level free agent, so the downside with his contract is pretty minimal and the upside - that he hits .275/.350/.400 or better - is significant. Should Nishioka be able to translate his offensive game to the States, he could easily prove to be a 3.0 WAR player and an extremely cost effective option at a premium position.
Odds are of course, that he falls somewhere in between and, for a million less than the Twins gave Nick Punto last year, they get all the production and more.
While both Hudson and Hardy struggled throughout the year with injuries and didn't come close to realizing their full offensive potential, the layout proved beneficial as the Twins, with help from those two additions, vaulted to 94 wins in 2010. Now a year later the team will watch as Hudson departs via free agency and the decision on what to do with Hardy becomes complicated.
In an attempt to create some stability, the Twins placed their bid for NPB League MVP Tsuyoshi Nishioka. On November 26th came up the winners of the exclusive negotiation rights when the Chiba Lotte Marines accepted the Twins 5.6m bid. That gave the Twins a 30 day time frame to complete a deal with Nishioka. Should they be unable to complete the deal, the bid would be refunded.
As a general rule of thumb, players tend to sign contracts that are generally in line with their bids. Diasuke Matsuzaka signed a 50m deal after a winning bid of 51.1m, for example. Expectations are that the Twins should eventually be able to agree on a deal of around 3y/9m. Such a deal would secure Nishioka through his age 29 season.
Nishioka is regarded as a good defensive player at both shortstop and second base with good range and a solid/average arm, though more than one source has speculated that his arm would play better at second than short in the Majors. He does struggle with errors, but that should be more than made up for by his above average range. And, as long as Hardy is with the Twins (and that might not be for much longer) he'll almost certainly be slotted in at second.
Offensively Nishioka is harder to peg. There has been much talk about the fact that he topped Ichiro's single-season hit record, but little mention of his past as an injury plagued league average player. At his best, he's a player who will hit for solid averages, draw some walks, steal some bases, and slap the ball around while using the gaps for his extra base power. He does have enough power to project for a handful of home runs, but the elongated leg kick that he and so many other Japanese players utilize doesn't translate well to the Major Leagues and it's likely he'll need to drop that, which could diminish his power further. Think, .300/.375/.425 - .800.
The problem is that Japanese players, outside of Ichiro and Hideki Matsui, have struggled to translate their offensive talents at the Major League level. Couple that with the fact that, until last year, Nishioka was a fairly average player who struggled to stay healthy and there is some legitimate downside. He could certainly wash out the way a much more accomplished Kaz Matsui did and prove to be nothing more than an error prone, low OPS second baseman.
Thankfully from the Twins perspective, they won't be paying him like a legitimate star. Rather, they'll be paying him like a replacement-level free agent, so the downside with his contract is pretty minimal and the upside - that he hits .275/.350/.400 or better - is significant. Should Nishioka be able to translate his offensive game to the States, he could easily prove to be a 3.0 WAR player and an extremely cost effective option at a premium position.
Odds are of course, that he falls somewhere in between and, for a million less than the Twins gave Nick Punto last year, they get all the production and more.
Saying Goodbye To Bobby Jenks
The Angels knew they had something special in the big kid. He threw 100MPH+ and his flashed two solid/plus breaking pitches. Guys like that didn't just grow on trees. But he was also a walking injury and a pain-in-the-ass to deal with it. After four seasons of it, the Angels were done and, following the 2004 season, they unceremoniously designated Bobby Jenks for assignment. Not surprisingly, Kenny Williams was waiting.
After being picked up by the White Sox Jenks quickly made his debut in the Majors the following season at age 24 by pitching in 32 games. He began as a setup man for Dustin Hermansen on a team that would go on to win the World Series, but quickly moved up and by seasons end had recorded the first six saves of his career and by the end of the season was the teams closer. In the playoffs he managed to convery four of his five opportunities and capped a remarkable rookie year by getting the final out of their World Championship season.
Not a bad way to introduce yourself to the hometown fans.
During those early years Jenks fastball was amongst the best in baseball. His rookie year his fastball sat at an average of 97.0MPH and he pumped it up as high as 102 in a game. He paired that with a tight slider and a hard fall-off-the-table curveball at 83-84 that was simply unfair. He used that combination to rank up K rates of 10.74 during his first two seasons while getting groundballs on over half his balls in play. Despite some wildness - he walked 3.8/9IP those first two seasons - the combination of high strikeouts and groundballs was perfect for the closers role and he converted 47 of his 53 opportunities.
Unfortunately in 2008, Jenks would suffer a shoulder injury and he never full recovered. His fastball velocity, which had already begun to decline the previous season was down to 93.8MPH and his curve didn't have the same bite it used to. Jenks began using his slider more and while it may have saved wear-and-tear on his arm, it was never as effective of a pitch as his curveball.
But even through all the arm trouble, the injuries, and his declining raw stuff, Jenks managed to get the job done. That is, until 2010 when he was plagued by nagging pain to his back, his calf, and his forearm (in no particular order). An inflated ERA, some ugly blown saves, and persistently negative commentary from Manager Ozzie Guillen left his closers role in doubt.
What was surprising in all of this is that 2010 may have been his best season in terms of rate stats. His 10.42K/9 was the second best of his career, his 3.30 BB/9 was just a tick above his career average of 2.90, and his 58.3% GB rate was the second best mark of his career as well. Adding on to that, he had recovered some of his lost fastball velocity, checking in at an average of 95mph - the hardest he'd thrown since 2006.
That said, Jenks' stuff simply isn't what it used to be. Particularly his curveball and slider which have each declined.mSadly Jenks' injuries, coupled with his difficulty in closing out games and his approaching final year of arbitration, where he'd have been likely to have earned 9m or more (after earning 7.5m in his second arb. season), spelled the end for Jenks' time in the South Side. On December 2nd the White declined to offer arbitration and Jenks officially became a free agent for the first time in his career.
Who will close out games for the White Sox in 2011 remains to be seen. But one would assume that Matt Thornton would be the presumptive favorite. We'll talk about that more as spring approaches, but for now, we'll bid farewell to Bobby Jenks.
After being picked up by the White Sox Jenks quickly made his debut in the Majors the following season at age 24 by pitching in 32 games. He began as a setup man for Dustin Hermansen on a team that would go on to win the World Series, but quickly moved up and by seasons end had recorded the first six saves of his career and by the end of the season was the teams closer. In the playoffs he managed to convery four of his five opportunities and capped a remarkable rookie year by getting the final out of their World Championship season.
Not a bad way to introduce yourself to the hometown fans.
During those early years Jenks fastball was amongst the best in baseball. His rookie year his fastball sat at an average of 97.0MPH and he pumped it up as high as 102 in a game. He paired that with a tight slider and a hard fall-off-the-table curveball at 83-84 that was simply unfair. He used that combination to rank up K rates of 10.74 during his first two seasons while getting groundballs on over half his balls in play. Despite some wildness - he walked 3.8/9IP those first two seasons - the combination of high strikeouts and groundballs was perfect for the closers role and he converted 47 of his 53 opportunities.
Unfortunately in 2008, Jenks would suffer a shoulder injury and he never full recovered. His fastball velocity, which had already begun to decline the previous season was down to 93.8MPH and his curve didn't have the same bite it used to. Jenks began using his slider more and while it may have saved wear-and-tear on his arm, it was never as effective of a pitch as his curveball.
But even through all the arm trouble, the injuries, and his declining raw stuff, Jenks managed to get the job done. That is, until 2010 when he was plagued by nagging pain to his back, his calf, and his forearm (in no particular order). An inflated ERA, some ugly blown saves, and persistently negative commentary from Manager Ozzie Guillen left his closers role in doubt.
What was surprising in all of this is that 2010 may have been his best season in terms of rate stats. His 10.42K/9 was the second best of his career, his 3.30 BB/9 was just a tick above his career average of 2.90, and his 58.3% GB rate was the second best mark of his career as well. Adding on to that, he had recovered some of his lost fastball velocity, checking in at an average of 95mph - the hardest he'd thrown since 2006.
That said, Jenks' stuff simply isn't what it used to be. Particularly his curveball and slider which have each declined.mSadly Jenks' injuries, coupled with his difficulty in closing out games and his approaching final year of arbitration, where he'd have been likely to have earned 9m or more (after earning 7.5m in his second arb. season), spelled the end for Jenks' time in the South Side. On December 2nd the White declined to offer arbitration and Jenks officially became a free agent for the first time in his career.
Who will close out games for the White Sox in 2011 remains to be seen. But one would assume that Matt Thornton would be the presumptive favorite. We'll talk about that more as spring approaches, but for now, we'll bid farewell to Bobby Jenks.
Monday, December 6, 2010
White Sox Sign Adam Dunn
Kenny Williams strikes again. It has been common knowledge around the league that the White Sox have been in pursuit of Adam Dunn for some time and Kenny finally got his man. Williams has a way of making deals appear virtually out of thin air and this is no exception. While we all knew that Williams and the White Sox tried - and failed - to swing a deal with the Nationals for the slugger at the trade deadline last year, there had been little to no news on that front so far this off season. So when the news came that a deal was in place it surprised me a bit. Not because I didn't consider the possibility of Dunn coming to the Sox, but rather because it happened so fast.
When I ran down the payroll situation of the White Sox at the outset of this years off season, I knew Williams was going to have his hands full trying to improve his club enough to leapfrog the Twins while having little money to work. With and some tough positions to fill, even with the expected non-tendering of closer Bobby Jenks, money was still going to be tight. Thankfully, the deep pockets of owner Jerry Reinsdorf appear to be giving Williams a little extra wiggle room.
Payroll constraints not withstanding, one area that seemed almost certain to be addressed was designated hitter, where the White Sox received horrible production after a failed experiment at signing light hitting position players to man a position where hitting is the only job.
By signing Dunn to a 4 year 56 million dollar deal the White Sox have ensured that they'll have one of the games pre-eminent power hitters in the middle of their lineup for years to come. Though, much like with the signing of Victor Martinez in Detroit, they'll be getting Dunn for the tail end of his prime and the beginning of his decline phase as he'll be 32 in 2011. Of course, all players age differently and there is nothing to say that Dunn wont produce the best numbers of his career while in Chicago. Dunn could provide a fantastic complement to the right handed Paul Konerko, should the White be able to bring him back (more on that later) - or anchor a lineup all on his own should a deal not be able to be worked out.
One of the most prolific home run hitters in the game today - and one of it's most prolific strikeout artists (32.8% for his career!) - Dunn is the definition of a all-or-nothing swinger. Of his 145 hits last year, 76 went for extra bases. Dunn is going to swing and miss a lot, that's just a fact of life, but when he doesn't miss, he has a tendency to hit the ball very, very hard. Of course, it's not just Dunn's power that makes him valuable, he's also one of the games best at taking a walk (I guess the thought of a strike being hit 450 feet will entice guys to nibble a bit more than normal). His power/on-base combination have made him one of the games best, and most consistent offensive forces as he has posted an OPS of .890 or better in six of the past seven seasons.
Of course, we also know that Dunn has his faults. There are the strikeouts of course, but there is plenty of debate as to just how much worse a strikeout is than another sort of out - or if it's worse at all. So I'll leave the relevance of that particular aspect of his game to your own judgment. Because of the strikeouts, Dunn isn't going to hit for average, but thankfully to say, he takes all those walks which still allows him to be an on-base machine. What isn't debatable is the fact that playing Dunn at any position is a serious hazard to health of your pitchers ERA's. After five straight seasons with a mind-boggling -23 UZR/150 (AT LEAST!!!) or worse at first base, Dunn showed some improvement during the past year, but it's likely that's just noise. And, in left field he's really no better.
He's so bad in fact that playing him in the field regularly forces him to lose a massive amount of his value. In 2009, for instance, despite posting a .928 OPS (good for a 4.1 oWAR according to Baseball-reference) was worth a -3.2 dWAR. So in the end, his value - at least according to WAR, was just barely above average. While that's an extreme example (his dWAR has never approached those numbers again) he's fairly consistently cost his team significantly on the field.
Thankfully to say, the White Sox play in the American League where they can bury his glove at DH. Initially Dunn had been hesitant to accept a role with a team that would use him as a designated hitter (probably because it lowers a players value as a free agent by a good amount), but it appears he's come around. If the White Sox can avoid deploying Dunn in their defensive rotation as much as possible, it's likely that he'll be worth a consistent 3.5-4.0 WAR for at least the first 2-3 years of his contract. If so, this could be a brilliant deal for the White Sox. But if Ozzie Guillen should, for some reason, insist on playing Dunn in the field, this could just as easily become a disaster.
If we assume that Dunn can be worth at least 3.0 WAR per year, an easily attainable goal provided good health and minimal time playing defense, he'd be worth a minimum of around 51m. That's close enough to even money for a free agent signing for it to be considered a success. And really, 3.0 WAR as a DH is probably his downside. If he can produce the way he has throughout his career he should easily be worth more. At the likely rate of around 4.0 WAR, he'll be worth 68m - a number that would easily eclipse what the White Sox will be paying him.
If properly utilized, Dunn should provide a legitimate middle-of-the-order run-producing bat for the next four years who can help mash the White Sox back to the post season in homer-friendly US Cellular. He could also prove to be something even more rare - a free agent steal.
When I ran down the payroll situation of the White Sox at the outset of this years off season, I knew Williams was going to have his hands full trying to improve his club enough to leapfrog the Twins while having little money to work. With and some tough positions to fill, even with the expected non-tendering of closer Bobby Jenks, money was still going to be tight. Thankfully, the deep pockets of owner Jerry Reinsdorf appear to be giving Williams a little extra wiggle room.
Payroll constraints not withstanding, one area that seemed almost certain to be addressed was designated hitter, where the White Sox received horrible production after a failed experiment at signing light hitting position players to man a position where hitting is the only job.
By signing Dunn to a 4 year 56 million dollar deal the White Sox have ensured that they'll have one of the games pre-eminent power hitters in the middle of their lineup for years to come. Though, much like with the signing of Victor Martinez in Detroit, they'll be getting Dunn for the tail end of his prime and the beginning of his decline phase as he'll be 32 in 2011. Of course, all players age differently and there is nothing to say that Dunn wont produce the best numbers of his career while in Chicago. Dunn could provide a fantastic complement to the right handed Paul Konerko, should the White be able to bring him back (more on that later) - or anchor a lineup all on his own should a deal not be able to be worked out.
One of the most prolific home run hitters in the game today - and one of it's most prolific strikeout artists (32.8% for his career!) - Dunn is the definition of a all-or-nothing swinger. Of his 145 hits last year, 76 went for extra bases. Dunn is going to swing and miss a lot, that's just a fact of life, but when he doesn't miss, he has a tendency to hit the ball very, very hard. Of course, it's not just Dunn's power that makes him valuable, he's also one of the games best at taking a walk (I guess the thought of a strike being hit 450 feet will entice guys to nibble a bit more than normal). His power/on-base combination have made him one of the games best, and most consistent offensive forces as he has posted an OPS of .890 or better in six of the past seven seasons.
Of course, we also know that Dunn has his faults. There are the strikeouts of course, but there is plenty of debate as to just how much worse a strikeout is than another sort of out - or if it's worse at all. So I'll leave the relevance of that particular aspect of his game to your own judgment. Because of the strikeouts, Dunn isn't going to hit for average, but thankfully to say, he takes all those walks which still allows him to be an on-base machine. What isn't debatable is the fact that playing Dunn at any position is a serious hazard to health of your pitchers ERA's. After five straight seasons with a mind-boggling -23 UZR/150 (AT LEAST!!!) or worse at first base, Dunn showed some improvement during the past year, but it's likely that's just noise. And, in left field he's really no better.
He's so bad in fact that playing him in the field regularly forces him to lose a massive amount of his value. In 2009, for instance, despite posting a .928 OPS (good for a 4.1 oWAR according to Baseball-reference) was worth a -3.2 dWAR. So in the end, his value - at least according to WAR, was just barely above average. While that's an extreme example (his dWAR has never approached those numbers again) he's fairly consistently cost his team significantly on the field.
Thankfully to say, the White Sox play in the American League where they can bury his glove at DH. Initially Dunn had been hesitant to accept a role with a team that would use him as a designated hitter (probably because it lowers a players value as a free agent by a good amount), but it appears he's come around. If the White Sox can avoid deploying Dunn in their defensive rotation as much as possible, it's likely that he'll be worth a consistent 3.5-4.0 WAR for at least the first 2-3 years of his contract. If so, this could be a brilliant deal for the White Sox. But if Ozzie Guillen should, for some reason, insist on playing Dunn in the field, this could just as easily become a disaster.
If we assume that Dunn can be worth at least 3.0 WAR per year, an easily attainable goal provided good health and minimal time playing defense, he'd be worth a minimum of around 51m. That's close enough to even money for a free agent signing for it to be considered a success. And really, 3.0 WAR as a DH is probably his downside. If he can produce the way he has throughout his career he should easily be worth more. At the likely rate of around 4.0 WAR, he'll be worth 68m - a number that would easily eclipse what the White Sox will be paying him.
If properly utilized, Dunn should provide a legitimate middle-of-the-order run-producing bat for the next four years who can help mash the White Sox back to the post season in homer-friendly US Cellular. He could also prove to be something even more rare - a free agent steal.
Tigers Ink Catcher Victor martinez
With a need in the bullpen addressed by the signing of reliever Joaquin Benoit earlier, Tigers General Manager Dave Dombrowski turned his attention to solidifying a catchers position that was amongst the worst in the league offensively in 2010. To do so, he signed none other than Victor Martinez, hands down the bet option available among this seasons crop of free agent catchers. While we can debate the overall value of Martinez as a catcher and how he will fit in with the 2011 Tigers (and we will, at length!) it’s safe to say that the acquisition of Martinez will, at a minimum, make the the Tigers often punchless lineup last season, much more formidable for the foreseeable future.
First, lets break down the contract. At four years, and fifty million dollars - the Tigers will be acquiring Martinez for what is likely to be the beginning of the decline phase of his career. Ideally, you’d probably like to give Martinez, 33 in late December, maybe just three years as catchers (and most players in general) tend to decline offensive at a pretty steep rate after age 34-35. But given the scarcity of good hitting catchers, combined with the Tigers general lack of offense, and the fact that Martinez will likely spend a good amount of time at designated hitter - the contract has an above average chance at being worthwhile in my opinion.
Over the past four full seasons, Martinez has been worth 4.5 (2007), 0.6 (2008), 4.7 (2009), and 3.0 WAR (2010) - using our standard rate of 4.25m per win, he’s been worth a total 54.4m during those three seasons. Of course, his 2008 was mostly lost due to injury, and that’s worth at least noting.
Given the fact that hose four seasons were essentially the back-end of his prime, and he’ll be 33 at the outset of this contract, it’s unlikely that he duplicates that level of value - but he doesn’t need to in order to justify his deal. At 50m over four years, he’ll need to average ‘just’ 2.94 WAR per season. Obviously that’s still an impressive mark, and it will be difficult for him to attain without spending significant time as a close-to-league-average catcher - but it’s do-able. The switch hitting Martinez, even at 32 years old, didn’t show any noticeable signs of decline at the plate as he continued to hit with the games best offensive catchers, posting a .302/.351/.493 - .844 OPS that was second only to Joe Mauer in the American League.
Of course his value to the Tigers will ultimately be defined by just how much time he can spend behind the plate as a capable option at catcher, because his bat is great at that position, but significantly less so as a DH. Martinez has long been known as a below average receiver behind the plate, and struggled as much as ever in throwing out runners in 2010 as teams ran at will, stealing 99 bases in 125 attempts (a 79.5% success rate). But if he can manage to stay healthy, and not get any worse, at least in the near-term (the next two years) he’ll provide just what the Tigers need.
In Alex Avila the Tigers have a solid back-up. The 23 year old Avila was rushed to the Majors in 2009 as the Tigers needed someone to pair with the now departed Gerald Laird, and his power bat against right-handed pitching helped carry the Tigers through their late-season playoff push that ultimately came up just short. But Avila, at this point at least, is strictly a platoon option as he struggles mightily against left-handed pitching. That said, he’s a solid if unspectacular defender who does a capable job of controlling the running game and should be a fine late-game replacement should the Tigers feel the need to replace Martinez in such situations. Offensively, he’ll make a decent platoon partner against right-handed pitching when the Tigers decide to have Martinez DH.
As Martinez ages, particularly over the final two years of his contract, it’s likely that he’ll be increasingly relegated to DH duties where his bat should still be around league average for the position. The hope for the Tigers would be that Martinez stays healthy and proves to be a capable option at catcher for the next two seasons while continuing to post WAR marks in the 4.0 range while providing help in the middle of the lineup -either by creating chances in front of Miguel Cabrera, or by providing “protection” (which I really don’t believe in) behind him. Personally, I’d probably bat Martinez ahead of Cabrera if only because Martinez’s bat simply isn’t such a threat, even now, to prevent teams from working around Cabrera.
If Martinez can stay healthy and follow a WAR progression of 4.0 - 4.0 - 2.5 - 2.5 through his contract, he’ll more than justify the signing. Of course, that’s always the risk in signing free agents. You’re going to pay them for the best possible scenario, and are always unlikely to get it. But as free agent signings go, I think this is one that will pay off.
First, lets break down the contract. At four years, and fifty million dollars - the Tigers will be acquiring Martinez for what is likely to be the beginning of the decline phase of his career. Ideally, you’d probably like to give Martinez, 33 in late December, maybe just three years as catchers (and most players in general) tend to decline offensive at a pretty steep rate after age 34-35. But given the scarcity of good hitting catchers, combined with the Tigers general lack of offense, and the fact that Martinez will likely spend a good amount of time at designated hitter - the contract has an above average chance at being worthwhile in my opinion.
Over the past four full seasons, Martinez has been worth 4.5 (2007), 0.6 (2008), 4.7 (2009), and 3.0 WAR (2010) - using our standard rate of 4.25m per win, he’s been worth a total 54.4m during those three seasons. Of course, his 2008 was mostly lost due to injury, and that’s worth at least noting.
Given the fact that hose four seasons were essentially the back-end of his prime, and he’ll be 33 at the outset of this contract, it’s unlikely that he duplicates that level of value - but he doesn’t need to in order to justify his deal. At 50m over four years, he’ll need to average ‘just’ 2.94 WAR per season. Obviously that’s still an impressive mark, and it will be difficult for him to attain without spending significant time as a close-to-league-average catcher - but it’s do-able. The switch hitting Martinez, even at 32 years old, didn’t show any noticeable signs of decline at the plate as he continued to hit with the games best offensive catchers, posting a .302/.351/.493 - .844 OPS that was second only to Joe Mauer in the American League.
Of course his value to the Tigers will ultimately be defined by just how much time he can spend behind the plate as a capable option at catcher, because his bat is great at that position, but significantly less so as a DH. Martinez has long been known as a below average receiver behind the plate, and struggled as much as ever in throwing out runners in 2010 as teams ran at will, stealing 99 bases in 125 attempts (a 79.5% success rate). But if he can manage to stay healthy, and not get any worse, at least in the near-term (the next two years) he’ll provide just what the Tigers need.
In Alex Avila the Tigers have a solid back-up. The 23 year old Avila was rushed to the Majors in 2009 as the Tigers needed someone to pair with the now departed Gerald Laird, and his power bat against right-handed pitching helped carry the Tigers through their late-season playoff push that ultimately came up just short. But Avila, at this point at least, is strictly a platoon option as he struggles mightily against left-handed pitching. That said, he’s a solid if unspectacular defender who does a capable job of controlling the running game and should be a fine late-game replacement should the Tigers feel the need to replace Martinez in such situations. Offensively, he’ll make a decent platoon partner against right-handed pitching when the Tigers decide to have Martinez DH.
As Martinez ages, particularly over the final two years of his contract, it’s likely that he’ll be increasingly relegated to DH duties where his bat should still be around league average for the position. The hope for the Tigers would be that Martinez stays healthy and proves to be a capable option at catcher for the next two seasons while continuing to post WAR marks in the 4.0 range while providing help in the middle of the lineup -either by creating chances in front of Miguel Cabrera, or by providing “protection” (which I really don’t believe in) behind him. Personally, I’d probably bat Martinez ahead of Cabrera if only because Martinez’s bat simply isn’t such a threat, even now, to prevent teams from working around Cabrera.
If Martinez can stay healthy and follow a WAR progression of 4.0 - 4.0 - 2.5 - 2.5 through his contract, he’ll more than justify the signing. Of course, that’s always the risk in signing free agents. You’re going to pay them for the best possible scenario, and are always unlikely to get it. But as free agent signings go, I think this is one that will pay off.
Tigers Sign Joaquin Benoit
After a career of up-and-down performances with the Texas Rangers that culminated with his missing the entire 2009 season after rotator-cuff surgery, Joaquin Benoit signed a minor league deal with the Tampa Bay Rays with an invite to spring training. Benoit always had a decent arm, working in the 91-92mph range and missed plenty of bats. But he had been plagued by injuries and control issues. For the league minimum, the Rays got 60.1 innings of a 1.34 ERA and a 1.5 WAR - just a tick below Rafael Soriano (1.6) and Mariano Rivera (1.7). Suffice it to say, they got their monies worth.
Fast forward to one year later and the Tigers, looking to bolster a bullpen that struggled mightily when injury-prone flam-throwing righty Joel Zumaya went down with a broken elbow, swooped in early to make the first meaningful signing of the 2010-2011 off season. They inked Benoit to a three year, sixteen-and-a-half million dollar deal that ranks as one of the richest ever for a non-closer.
It's a significant layout for a player who has had just one dominant year in his career, with a history of injuries, and it's a deal that comes with obvious pluses and minuses.
Beyond Benoit's obvious talents, the fact that he wouldn't cost the Tigers a draft pick - as other potential options might have - might be his greatest benefit in my mind. Even with the Tigers later moving to sign Victor Martinez, they still could've lost their second round pick - something most analysts view as being worth at least 500K - and perhaps more importantly, something a team with a relatively weak farm system like the Tigers would like to retain. That said, Benoit's as talented as anyone else available and, should he stay healthy, will prove to be a good contributor for the Tigers and reliable bridge to closer Jose Valverde.
History suggests that Benoit will likely not be worth every penny he's going to get paid. That's partly due to the fact that relievers just don't effect enough innings to play major roles on any team. This is particularly true in the case of Benoit, who hasn't been healthy enough to register a season with more than 60 innings since 2007. But it's also because Benoit simply isn't a likely candidate to repeat his success of 2010.
Consider if you will that Benoit set career marks in strikeout rate, walk rate, ground ball rate, and not surprisingly bested his career best FIP and xFIP marks by over a run and a half each. He did so on the back of a .201 BABIP - 90 points lower than his career average. The odds of ANY pitcher repeating such success is pretty much nil, and they're even lower for someone who has never approached such production before while playing at the most statistically volatile position in the game.
As for the contract itself, there are a few different ways to look at it. We can take the simplistic view that the Tigers had a need, and filled it. That in itself should be viewed as a success.We can also look at it in terms of comparative value - how much better will Benoit be than an internal option such as Daniel Schlereth or a cheaper external option such as Koji Uehara?
Finally, we can look at it in terms of statistical value. This of course, is the lense with which I prefer to view the game. If we assume that a single WAR is worth about 4.25m, Benoit would have to be worth 1.29WAR per season make the deal a break-even one for the Tigers. It's not impossible of course - Benoit put together such a stretch earlier in his career when he was contributing 80+ innings per season. But he's not that player anymore and hasn't been for awhile.
When we look at similar long-term deals for middle-relievers - such as those given to Bobby Seay and Scott Linebrink - we see deals that gave long-term stability to pitchers who's long-term impact should've been considered questionable at best. Both of those relievers signed three year deals with their new clubs and have either failed to produce at all (Seay due to injury) or have produced so poorly that their contracts end up being detrimental (Linebrink). In both cases, the acquiring teams likely wish they hadn't made such deals. There is some similarity with Benoit in that regard. He is getting paid quite a bit by middle-relief standards, and he'll be getting paid that way for quite awhile. And ultimately, he is a bit bigger risk than some of his free agent companions.
So what can we expect to see from Benoit going forward? It's a little bit tough to say. On the one hand you have his lifetime body of work, which suggests flashes of brilliance that overall, are marked by an inability to command the strike zone throughout the season. On the other, we have what would appear to be the new-and-improved Benoit - the one who came back from major shoulder surgery pitching like the bionic man.
But if I had to venture a guess (and I guess that's the job you're not paying me to do) I'd project the improved strikeout rate to stick while the walk rate normalizes and ultimately you're left with a player somewhere in between who he was pre-surgery, and who he was last year. In terms of his FIP, I'd expect to see marks in the mid-threes and and ERA that hovers in he mid-to-high threes or low fours which would be a fair amount better than the 4.47 ERA he's accumulated throughout his career.
I'm not completely in love with this deal from the Tigers perspective in the sense that I think it'll ultimately be viewed in a poor light as it becomes apparent that they have equally capable options within the franchise already - be it Zumaya, Schlereth or Ryan Perry. But there is also a chance that this could work out very nicely if Benoit's improved command sticks. If that's the case, he could prove to be an expensive setup man who helps the Tigers bullpen be one of the better ones in baseball.
Fast forward to one year later and the Tigers, looking to bolster a bullpen that struggled mightily when injury-prone flam-throwing righty Joel Zumaya went down with a broken elbow, swooped in early to make the first meaningful signing of the 2010-2011 off season. They inked Benoit to a three year, sixteen-and-a-half million dollar deal that ranks as one of the richest ever for a non-closer.
It's a significant layout for a player who has had just one dominant year in his career, with a history of injuries, and it's a deal that comes with obvious pluses and minuses.
Beyond Benoit's obvious talents, the fact that he wouldn't cost the Tigers a draft pick - as other potential options might have - might be his greatest benefit in my mind. Even with the Tigers later moving to sign Victor Martinez, they still could've lost their second round pick - something most analysts view as being worth at least 500K - and perhaps more importantly, something a team with a relatively weak farm system like the Tigers would like to retain. That said, Benoit's as talented as anyone else available and, should he stay healthy, will prove to be a good contributor for the Tigers and reliable bridge to closer Jose Valverde.
History suggests that Benoit will likely not be worth every penny he's going to get paid. That's partly due to the fact that relievers just don't effect enough innings to play major roles on any team. This is particularly true in the case of Benoit, who hasn't been healthy enough to register a season with more than 60 innings since 2007. But it's also because Benoit simply isn't a likely candidate to repeat his success of 2010.
Consider if you will that Benoit set career marks in strikeout rate, walk rate, ground ball rate, and not surprisingly bested his career best FIP and xFIP marks by over a run and a half each. He did so on the back of a .201 BABIP - 90 points lower than his career average. The odds of ANY pitcher repeating such success is pretty much nil, and they're even lower for someone who has never approached such production before while playing at the most statistically volatile position in the game.
As for the contract itself, there are a few different ways to look at it. We can take the simplistic view that the Tigers had a need, and filled it. That in itself should be viewed as a success.We can also look at it in terms of comparative value - how much better will Benoit be than an internal option such as Daniel Schlereth or a cheaper external option such as Koji Uehara?
Finally, we can look at it in terms of statistical value. This of course, is the lense with which I prefer to view the game. If we assume that a single WAR is worth about 4.25m, Benoit would have to be worth 1.29WAR per season make the deal a break-even one for the Tigers. It's not impossible of course - Benoit put together such a stretch earlier in his career when he was contributing 80+ innings per season. But he's not that player anymore and hasn't been for awhile.
When we look at similar long-term deals for middle-relievers - such as those given to Bobby Seay and Scott Linebrink - we see deals that gave long-term stability to pitchers who's long-term impact should've been considered questionable at best. Both of those relievers signed three year deals with their new clubs and have either failed to produce at all (Seay due to injury) or have produced so poorly that their contracts end up being detrimental (Linebrink). In both cases, the acquiring teams likely wish they hadn't made such deals. There is some similarity with Benoit in that regard. He is getting paid quite a bit by middle-relief standards, and he'll be getting paid that way for quite awhile. And ultimately, he is a bit bigger risk than some of his free agent companions.
So what can we expect to see from Benoit going forward? It's a little bit tough to say. On the one hand you have his lifetime body of work, which suggests flashes of brilliance that overall, are marked by an inability to command the strike zone throughout the season. On the other, we have what would appear to be the new-and-improved Benoit - the one who came back from major shoulder surgery pitching like the bionic man.
But if I had to venture a guess (and I guess that's the job you're not paying me to do) I'd project the improved strikeout rate to stick while the walk rate normalizes and ultimately you're left with a player somewhere in between who he was pre-surgery, and who he was last year. In terms of his FIP, I'd expect to see marks in the mid-threes and and ERA that hovers in he mid-to-high threes or low fours which would be a fair amount better than the 4.47 ERA he's accumulated throughout his career.
I'm not completely in love with this deal from the Tigers perspective in the sense that I think it'll ultimately be viewed in a poor light as it becomes apparent that they have equally capable options within the franchise already - be it Zumaya, Schlereth or Ryan Perry. But there is also a chance that this could work out very nicely if Benoit's improved command sticks. If that's the case, he could prove to be an expensive setup man who helps the Tigers bullpen be one of the better ones in baseball.
Monday, November 15, 2010
Wrapping up the 2010 White Sox.
Major League Wrap Up
2010 was a pendulum-swing kind of season for White Sox. They opened poorly and there was talk of a fire-sale before they had even reached the trading deadline as there were rumors of AJ Pierzynski being on the block and much hand-wringing about the off season decisions of GM Kenny Williams. Particularly in regard to the teams designated hitters, Mark Kotsay (-0.7 WAR) and Mark Teahan (-0.6 WAR), who turned out to be terribly misguided signings. More on that later. After losing on June 8th, the team was 22-33 and 9.5 games out of first with little sign of a turnaround in their future.
But a turnaround happened to be EXACTLY what was in their future as the team went on a monster run from June 9th through August 7th, going 40-15 and turning a 9.5 game deficit into a 1.5 game lead - a lead that at one point swelled to as much as 3.5 games - while leapfrogging the Tigers and Twins. Despite losing starter Jake Peavy for the season, the White Sox continued to battle the Twins for the division until a decisive spate of games in late August and early September allowed the red-hot Twins to effectively salt the division away.
In between, there were inspired offensive performances from aging veteran and team leader Paul Konerko who had perhaps the best season of his career, posting career best marks in essentially every advanced metric, from OPS (.977), to wOBA (.415) and RC+ (160). Alex Rios also had a nice bounce-back season, posting a .791 OPS after tanking in 2009, and shortstop Alexei Ramirez turned in the best offensive season of any shortstop in what was a poor offensive group of AL shortstops while being hosed for the Gold Glove by one Derek Jeter.
On the mound, the Sox got another strong season from John Danks, who continues to cement himself as one of the better starting pitchers in the game, posting a 117 ERA+ while topping 200 innings for the second straight season, and posting another strong ERA (3.72). Kenny Williams also made an interesting move mid-season to deal off a struggling Daniel Hudson for the enigmatic Edwin Jackson who pitched brilliantly down the stretch for the Sox. In the bullpen Matt Thornton (164 ERA+) and J.J. Putz (154 ERA+) combined to form perhaps the best setup combination in all of baseball, despite late season struggles.
There were also some promising seasons from youngsters Sergio Santos and Chris Sale, both of whom lit the bullpen world on fire with 96mph fastballs and wipeout sliders they'd throw in any count en route to racking up K rates over nine. Sale, fresh out of college and the first player from the 2010 draft to reach the Majors, and Santos, a converted infielder, both struggled with their command to varying extents. But both have the talent to be fixtures in the rotation (Sale) and bullpen (Santos) for years to come. Brent Morel also looks to have some promise at third with strong defense and a solid bat, I'm expecting a very good 2011 for him, more on that another day.
As for the aforementioned DH situation, the decision to bring in the two was largely the byproduct of a General Manager giving in to Manager Ozzie Guillen's misguided desire to add more positional flexibility at a spot where positional flexibility is least worthwhile. One would assume Williams wont be making the same mistake again in 2011. Unfortunately for Williams, the Teahan deal will be the deal that keeps on giving, as he's owed 4.75m in 2011 and 5.5m in 2012. Why Williams felt compelled to offer Teahan, who hadn't had a legitimately productive season since 2007 a three year deal continues to baffle me.
The team also got underwhelming performances from closer Bobby Jenks, supposed staff ace Peavy, and at least to some extent, catcher Pierzynski and outfielder/DH Carlos Quentin.
Sunday, November 14, 2010
Indians To Cut Payroll
After cutting payroll by almost exactly 20m from 81m in 2009 to 61m in 2010, it appears they'll do so again in 2011. Paul Hoynes is reporting that;
"Just how much money the Indians can spend on players has yet to be determined, but the payroll will drop from $61.5 million at the start of last season to between $40 million and $50 million."
Earlier this week, I made my first payroll projection for the 2011 Indians and had them at a division low 41.35m after arbitration raises are factored in. While Hoynes notes that there is no clear indication of how much room GM Chris Antonetti - entering his first full off season - will have to spend, it's clear that it likely wont be much more than about 9.5m, if my payroll calculations are correct. It could also be a fair amount less if Shin-Soo Choo ends up making more than 3.0m I have him pegged for in arbitration, or the final figure is closer to, say, 45m than 50m.
With that in mind, the Indians will be left in a position where they will be forced to either go into 2011 with little change from the roster currently in place - one that includes five players who project as regulars that posted OPS marks of .705 or lower in 2010. Yikes.
The payroll cut is likely at least partially the result of continued plummeting attendance as the Indians have seen attendance fall from just 28,097 per game during their 96 win 2007 season, to just 17,180 last year as the team experienced it's second straight season with fewer than 70 wins. With attendance down by 39%, a drop in payroll to 50m would be almost exactly on line (38.5%). Obviously also influential would be the corresponding loss of revenue from concessions and merchandise, amongst other factors.
Ultimately, this leads to a discussion of how winning effects revenues, and perhaps more importantly, precisely how cost-effective salary cutting measures such as trading star players (Cliff Lee, Victor Martinez, CC Sabathia) as they become more expensive really are. But that's a discussion (both interesting and important) for another day.
What needs to be focused on now is precisely how the Indians will try and address their many weaknesses during the 2010-2011 off season. The team could stand to have more reliable options at first (where Matt LaPorta will be given every chance to become a fixture), second, third, and left field. On the mound, they need a legitimate ace and a solid innings eater. The bullpen could use a reliable right-handed setup option. But other than that...
Obviously it'll be far beyond the capacities of Mr. Antonetti to address all these concerns, but how he goes about it should be interesting. The Indians made a nice play by pulling Austin Kearns off the scrap hep last year, but they'd need to make many more this off season, and do so with far less room to operate. Will the Indians stick with the players they have and try and make a few savvy acquisitions? Or will they perhaps try and make a trade to clear salary or further their rebuilding efforts?
We won't know, and I'm not going to use this particular piece for speculation, but we'll find out a lot about how Antonetti and the rest of the Indians management feel about the players they have in place and how much work they still think they need to do.
"Just how much money the Indians can spend on players has yet to be determined, but the payroll will drop from $61.5 million at the start of last season to between $40 million and $50 million."
Earlier this week, I made my first payroll projection for the 2011 Indians and had them at a division low 41.35m after arbitration raises are factored in. While Hoynes notes that there is no clear indication of how much room GM Chris Antonetti - entering his first full off season - will have to spend, it's clear that it likely wont be much more than about 9.5m, if my payroll calculations are correct. It could also be a fair amount less if Shin-Soo Choo ends up making more than 3.0m I have him pegged for in arbitration, or the final figure is closer to, say, 45m than 50m.
With that in mind, the Indians will be left in a position where they will be forced to either go into 2011 with little change from the roster currently in place - one that includes five players who project as regulars that posted OPS marks of .705 or lower in 2010. Yikes.
The payroll cut is likely at least partially the result of continued plummeting attendance as the Indians have seen attendance fall from just 28,097 per game during their 96 win 2007 season, to just 17,180 last year as the team experienced it's second straight season with fewer than 70 wins. With attendance down by 39%, a drop in payroll to 50m would be almost exactly on line (38.5%). Obviously also influential would be the corresponding loss of revenue from concessions and merchandise, amongst other factors.
Ultimately, this leads to a discussion of how winning effects revenues, and perhaps more importantly, precisely how cost-effective salary cutting measures such as trading star players (Cliff Lee, Victor Martinez, CC Sabathia) as they become more expensive really are. But that's a discussion (both interesting and important) for another day.
What needs to be focused on now is precisely how the Indians will try and address their many weaknesses during the 2010-2011 off season. The team could stand to have more reliable options at first (where Matt LaPorta will be given every chance to become a fixture), second, third, and left field. On the mound, they need a legitimate ace and a solid innings eater. The bullpen could use a reliable right-handed setup option. But other than that...
Obviously it'll be far beyond the capacities of Mr. Antonetti to address all these concerns, but how he goes about it should be interesting. The Indians made a nice play by pulling Austin Kearns off the scrap hep last year, but they'd need to make many more this off season, and do so with far less room to operate. Will the Indians stick with the players they have and try and make a few savvy acquisitions? Or will they perhaps try and make a trade to clear salary or further their rebuilding efforts?
We won't know, and I'm not going to use this particular piece for speculation, but we'll find out a lot about how Antonetti and the rest of the Indians management feel about the players they have in place and how much work they still think they need to do.
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